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Introduction
The threat of deportation looms large in the lives of unauthorized
immigrants. Faced with sexual harassment, unpaid wages, or a host of
other workplace violations, immigrant workers have long been forced to
choose between remaining silent or risking removal from the United States
by complaining. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, courts
mitigated the risk of deportation associated with workplace complaints by
broadly applying employment protections to all workers, irrespective of
immigration status. By clearly and consistently making status-based
issues irrelevant to employment protections, courts signaled to prospective
immigrant plaintiffs that questions about their "papers" would fall outside
the normal course of civil discovery. The extension of workplace protec-
tion to all employees regardless of immigration status avoided the perverse
economic incentive inevitably caused by such differentiation. Namely, a
system that absolves employers from illegal conduct taken against unautho-
rized immigrants lowers the cost of hiring that class of workers, thereby
incentivizing the practice.
The longstanding judicial effort to discourage illegal immigration by
harmonizing labor and immigration laws ended discordantly at the begin-
ning of this century with the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.' Finding a conflict between the federal prohibi-
tion on hiring unauthorized immigrants, as reflected in the Immigration
Reform Control Act (IRCA), 2 and awarding backpay to such workers for
violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 3 the Court held that
the latter practice must yield. 4 According to the Court, work-authorized
employees fired as victims of an employer's unfair labor practices are enti-
tled to all available remedies; unauthorized immigrants are not entitled to
monetary compensation.5 In so deciding, the Supreme Court laid the doc-
trinal foundation for a two-tiered legal system to match the two-tiered
workforce already in place 6 -one tier encompassing citizens, legal
1. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
4. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 145-46, 151-52.
5. Id. at 151.
6. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Worhers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World-
Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ, 651, 658 (2004) (crit-
icizing Hoffman for creating a "a class of workers without equal recourse or remedies");
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residents, and work-authorized nonimmigrants entitled to the full range of
remedies for workplace violations, and another tier encompassing unau-
thorized immigrants, 7 a group already in the shadow of the American
workforce, now in the shadow of the American legal system as well.
In Hoffman's wake, academics, lawyers, and judges have attempted to
predict whether the decision will extend beyond the NLRA, diminishing
other employment protections in the process. Was the holding limited to
administrative actions before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
or would unauthorized immigrants eventually be barred from bringing dis-
crimination and wage claims as well? The ambiguities created by Hoffman
provided employers with a sword to wield against an already submissive
workforce and a shield to defend against charges of illegality in the work-
place brought by immigrant employees.
Employers quickly embraced the decision in attempts to defeat a wide
range of claims brought by "suspected" immigrants. 8 A fashion designer
cited Hoffman to defend against wage claims brought by Chinese garment
workers.9 A construction company argued that Hoffman foreclosed a work-
see also NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, USED AND ABUSED: THE TREATMENT OF UNDOCU-
MENTED VICTIMS OF LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS SINCE Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 2
(2003), available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/Used%20and%2OAbused%2010
1003.pdf.
7. 1 use the term "unauthorized immigrant" to refer to foreign nationals who immi-
grate to the United States without authorization as well as those who immigrate legally
but later violate the terms of entry. Labels such as "undocumented worker" and "illegal
alien," both of which have been used to describe this group, present semantic difficul-
ties. See Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1595, 1597 (2005). Popular discourse commonly conflates the term "illegal alien"
with Mexican identity, providing an unnecessary political charge and underinclusive-
ness to the discussion. See id.; see also Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigra-
tion Laws: The Social Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263,
279-81 (1997) (discussing the use of the term "illegal alien" in legal discourse). Like-
wise, those who immigrate to the country without work authorization rarely lack "docu-
ments" but instead provide fraudulent paperwork to their employer at the time of hire in
order to comply with the verification system established by the IRCA. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(b) (2000). These workers are "documented" in the most literal sense. See JEF-
FREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERIS-
TICS 2 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf (using the term
"unauthorized migrant"). The non-citizens referred to here reside in the United States
without authorization from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and,
therefore, are described most accurately as "unauthorized immigrants." See OFFICE OF
POLICY & PLANNING, U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAU-
THORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990-2000 3 (2003),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lllReport_12
11.pdf (defining "unauthorized immigrants").
8. See Mariel Martinez, The Hoffman Aftermath: Analyzing the Plight of the Undocu-
mented Worker Through a "Wider Lens," 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 661, 682 (2005)
(summarizing the contention of some employers that "undocumented workers were thus
completely precluded from employment rights and all corresponding remedies"); see
also Anne Marie O'Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Worker's Compensation After Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 299, 300
(2006) (contending that Hoffman provided employers with a "green light" to argue that
undocumented workers are no longer covered by workplace protections).
9. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
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ers' compensation award to an immigrant who sustained head injuries at
the worksite.' 0 Although most attempts to extend Hoffman beyond the
NLRA have failed,1 1 some defendants have experienced limited success,
12
thus emboldening other employers to continue to argue that a plaintiff's
unauthorized immigration status limits recovery or eliminates liability alto-
gether. If Hoffman restricts workplace protections other than the NLRA, the
argument goes, then the plaintiffs immigration status matters; and if sta-
tus matters, then employers may ask the crucial question: Do you have
papers?
This article focuses on that question and the role the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination plays in its answer. Although
most scholarly attention has focused on Hoffman's substantive limita-
tions, 13 the decision is far more significant for the revolution in discovery
that it has produced. 14 With employers now posing immigration-related
questions with impunity, immigrant plaintiffs who were already uneasy
with asserting workplace claims have ceased suing employers to avoid
answering questions about their immigration status. Without an effective
methodology for addressing status-based discovery, immigrant workers,
both legal and unauthorized, will continue to opt out of employment
litigation.
This article tracks the Hoffman-created transformation in civil discov-
ery while proposing a role for the Fifth Amendment in immigrant-initiated
employment litigation. I begin by providing a brief overview of Hoffman,
the lower courts' reactions, and the ensuing shift toward invasive status-
based discovery. In the second section, I explain how status-based discov-
ery not only dissuades immigrant employees from vindicating their work-
place rights but also weakens the employment protections at issue. As the
frequency and predictability of status-based questions increase, more
unauthorized immigrants will refrain from suing, thereby excluding an
entire class of workers from asserting claims under federal employment
statutes that by design rely on private attorneys general for their enforce-
ment. In addition to unauthorized immigrants, any plaintiff employee who
appears "illegal" to the defendant will experience the repercussions.
10. Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa.
2002).
11. See, e.g., De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238-39 (C.D. Ill.
2002) (noting that Hoffman is "not dispositive" on Title VII and FLSA claims); Flores v.
Albertsons, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 00515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002)
(holding that Hoffman does not prevent recovery of unpaid wages under the FLSA).
12. See Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1335 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (personal injury); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896-98
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (Title VII sexual harassment); Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d
510, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (workers' compensation).
13. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 HAuv. L. REv. 2171,
2241-44 (2005) (arguing against IRCA preemption under Hoffman); O'Donovan, supra
note 8, at 304-07; Rebecca Smith et al., Low Pay, High Risk: State Models for Advancing
Immigrant Workers" Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 597, 602-07 (2004) (argu-
ing against Hoffman's extension to Title VII and other federal employment statutes).
14. See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 13, at 2244.
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In the third section, I propose a role for the Fifth Amendment in immi-
grant-initiated employment litigation. I begin by reviewing, evaluating, and
ultimately dismissing as inadequate the responses offered by academics
and practitioners to the problems posed by discovery in the post-Hoffman
era. The conventional wisdom recommends obtaining a protective order
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Examining the purpose
and structure of Rule 26, I argue that protective orders fail to satisfy immi-
grants' interests in anonymity, consistency, and certainty. Beyond that
incongruity, I outline the protective order's practical limitations, including
third-party access and malleability.
After rejecting the current strategies for addressing questions about
status, I explain why the privilege against self-incrimination is a highly
effective -although presently ignored- strategy for serving immigrants' liti-
gation needs. I contend that the policies in support of extending the privi-
lege to the civil context play a prominent role in immigrant-initiated
litigation. Civil libertarian values traditionally associated with the privi-
lege, such as privacy and the prevention of cruelty, 15 are threatened when
courts grant defendants unfettered access to status-based discovery. The
privilege is said to prevent the witness from facing the "cruel trilemma" of
perjury, self-incrimination, and contempt. 16 The choice is uniquely cruel
for the unauthorized immigrant who risks criminal prosecution and depor-
tation with a truthful answer to a question about status.
After evaluating the policies and principles of the privilege in the con-
text of status-based discovery, I discuss the consequences of invocation.
For example, courts in civil cases can draw an adverse inference from a
plaintiffs assertion of the Fifth Amendment. I outline factors counseling
against such inferences, including the unreliability of silence, the prejudi-
cial effect of adverse inferences, and the irrelevance of status to most
employment claims. I contend that even if courts infer that silent plaintiffs
are unauthorized immigrants, the outcome would be preferable to the cur-
rent amorphous state of affairs in which unauthorized immigrants occupy
a legally untenable space where employment rights and remedies remain
obscured by Hoffman. The privilege provides a vehicle for courts to clarify
these issues. In order to draw an adverse inference from a plaintiffs
silence, a court must first determine whether a plaintiffs unauthorized
immigration status is relevant to the claims at issue. If Hoffman did not
limit the workplace rights of unauthorized immigrants beyond the NLRA,
then status is irrelevant and the inference will not be drawn. Either way,
the inference analysis forces courts to declare whether status matters.
Thus, the privilege serves both protective and explanatory functions by
15. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REv. 430, 434-36
(2000) (criticizing the traditional rationales associated with the privilege); William J.
Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1232-42 (1988) (analyz-
ing the cruel choice theory and other rationales for the privilege).
16. See Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle- The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil
Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1086 (1982).
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guarding the witness's status-based information, while demanding a deter-
mination of immigrant-based employment rights after Hoffman.
I. Redefining Immigrant-Initiated Employment Litigation
In May 1988, Jose Castro applied for work at a plastics factory in Pano-
rama, California. 17 Castro submitted a Texas birth certificate, a California
driver's license, and a Social Security card with his application. 18 Approxi-
mately seven months after being hired, Castro joined several other employ-
ees to support a union-organizing campaign and distribute union
authorization cards to coworkers. 19 His employer, Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, laid off Castro and several other organizers the next month. 20
After an investigation and hearing, the NLRB determined that Hoffman had
unlawfully discharged Castro and three other employees in retaliation for
their union activities in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. The NLRB
ordered Hoffman to reinstate the employees with backpay and to cease and
desist from further violations.21
At a compliance hearing to determine the amount of backpay owed to
the workers, Hoffman's lawyer posed the following question to Castro:
"What kind of documents do you have that authorize you to work in the
United States?"'22 Although the administrative law judge (ALJ) presiding
over the hearing sustained the General Counsel's objection to the question,
the ALJ allowed Castro to answer through an offer of proof. Castro admit-
ted to being a Mexican national and conceded that he submitted a fraudu-
lent birth certificate, driver's license, and Social Security card to Hoffman
at the time of hire. 23 The ALJ denied Castro reinstatement and backpay,
holding that such remedies would conflict with the IRCA's prohibition2 4
on providing false documentation to prove employment eligibility. 25 The
NLRB reversed with respect to backpay, finding that awarding Castro wages
for lost work would effectuate the policies of the NLRA and the IRCA. 26
After the D.C. Circuit enforced the Board's order, 27 the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the NLRB was powerless to award backpay to
employees who, although victims of unfair labor practices, "themselves had
committed serious criminal acts." 28 The Court held that unauthorized
immigrants are not entitled to backpay under the NLRA because they are
17. Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in
LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 408 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
18. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140-41 (2002).
19. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
20. See id.
21. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 100-01 (1992).
22. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998).
23. Hoffinan, 535 U.S. at 141.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2000).
25. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994).
26. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1061-62 (1998).
27. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
28. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148-49.
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not "lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States," as
required by the IRCA. 29 In addition, unauthorized immigrants would be
unable to fulfill their statutory duty to mitigate damages for lost work with-
out further violating the IRCA by obtaining additional employment
through unlawful means. As Justice Scalia stated during oral argument,
because the unauthorized immigrant cannot lawfully mitigate his damages,
a backpay award would create an incentive for the immigrant to "just sit
home and eat chocolates .... -30
Hoffman rests on a strained statutory analysis of the NLRA and the
IRCA, as well as flawed assumptions about the incentives that drive illegal
immigration. Based on a broad definition of "employee"3 1 and a remedial
scheme designed to combat unfair labor practices as is necessary to "effec-
tuate the policies" of the Act,3 2 the NLRA appears to express a congres-
sional intent to extend workplace protections and remedies to all
employees, regardless of immigration status. Although the Court con-
cluded that such a reading of the NLRA would conflict with the IRCA, the
IRCA's legislative history addresses the issue explicitly, stating that the Act
was not intended to "limit the powers of federal or state labor relations
boards . .. to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented
employees .... ,,33 Congressional intent notwithstanding, the Court
inferred from the IRCA a need to ban backpay awards to unauthorized
immigrants in NLRA proceedings. According to the decision, awarding
damages to unauthorized immigrants in labor disputes would encourage
illegal immigration, thereby undermining the IRCA. Although studies con-
clude that a desire to obtain employment, not a speculative hope of labor
law remedies, drives illegal immigration, 3 4 the Court nonetheless pre-
sumed that precluding NLRA backpay awards would enhance IRCA
compliance.
29. Id. at 146 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984)).
30. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) ("The term 'employee' shall include any employee
.. ") (emphasis added).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
33. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662 (emphasis added). The House Education and Labor Committee created a similar
record: "[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of [the IRCA] would limit
the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies such as the ... Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ...to remedy unfair practices committed against
undocumented employees." H.R. REP. No. 99-682(11), at 8-9 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5757-58; see also Marianne Staniunas, All Employees Are Equal, but
Some Employees Are More Equal Than Others, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 393, 401 (2004)
(discussing congressional intent, as reflected in the IRCA).
34. See PASSEL, supra note 7, at 41 (2005) (citing job availability in the United States
and conditions in countries of origin as reasons for increased illegal immigration); see
also Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704-05 (11th Cir. 1988) ("By reducing the
incentive to hire such workers the FLSA's coverage of undocumented aliens helps dis-
courage illegal immigration and is thus fully consistent with the objectives of the
IRCA.").
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A. Hoffman's Expansion to Other Statutory Protections
Concerns about mass firings and deportations spread throughout
immigrant communities soon after Hoffman.35 Unscrupulous employers
used the decision to "straighten out" troublesome immigrant workers. 36 A
population already reluctant to complain about workplace wrongs became
more fearful of initiating litigation.3 7 Critics charged that the decision
encouraged employers to hire unauthorized immigrants. 38 Transnational
human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and the International Labor Organization held that Hoffman violated inter-
national migrants' right of association. 3 9 Employers attempted to expand
Hoffman beyond the NLRA to laws governing wages, discrimination, and
workplace safety, 40 fueling a frenzy of test cases across the country. 4 1
The post-Hoffman expansion movement has been wide-ranging. At its
most basic level, the argument proceeds as follows: If the Supreme Court
believes that monetary payments to unauthorized immigrants constitute a
"reward" for illegal behavior, then all employment claims brought by unau-
thorized immigrants are barred. Thus, employers have argued that Hoff-
man limits their obligation to pay for work already performed, 42 eliminates
sexual harassment protections for unauthorized immigrants, 43 and reduces
35. See generally Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign
Strategies of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 465, 500 (2006)
(describing how some employers intimidate workers by citing Hoffman).
36. See NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 6, at 6.
37. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, The New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making Federal Labor
Policy, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1, 5 n.19 (2003) (referring to the "mischief' created by the
Hoffman decision but predicting limited impact).
38. See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus
Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law when Labor Law Remedies Are
Restricted Based on Workers' Migrant Status, 1 SEATrLEJ. FOR SoC. JusT. 795, 802 (2003)
("Since these employers suffer no penalty for violating the law, they are encouraged to
hire the undocumented, and the goals of U.S. immigration laws are thus thwarted.");
Martinez, supra note 8, at 661.
39. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory
Opinion OC 18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003); Int'l
Labour Office, 332nd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, at 142, ILO Doc.
No. GB.288/7 (Pt. 1) (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/stan-
dards/relm/gb/docs/gb288/pdf/gb-7.pdf; see also LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:
WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS xxi (2004).
40. See Smith et al., supra note 13, at 605.
41. Martinez, supra note 8, at 664-66 (observing that "the rights of undocumented
immigrants have seemingly become more and more obscure" following Hoffman).
42. See, e.g., Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 321 (D.NJ. 2005)
("[Wal-Mart] contends that... Hoffman casts doubt on the notion that undocumented
workers are entitled to seek back pay for minimum wage and overtime under FLSA.");
Bob Egelko, Immigration: The Legal Whorl, S.F. CHRON., May 26, 2002, at A7 (discussing
the possible extension of Hoffman to all work-related claims).
43. Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896-98 (S.D. Tex. 2003);
NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAw PROJECT, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing sexual harassment);
Donna Y. Porter, Undocumented Workers Have NLRA Rights, but Not Monetary Remedies,
EMP. L. STRATECIST, Apr. 2002 (arguing that Hoffman may limit Title VII remedies).
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recoveries for on-the-job injuries sustained by unauthorized immigrants. 4 4
Taken to its extreme, the Hoffman expansion movement argues that unau-
thorized immigrants have no employment rights at all. 45
Attempts to broaden Hoffman notwithstanding, most courts have lim-
ited Hoffman to the NLRA. Nevertheless, a few judicial opinions have relied
on Hoffman to strike down employment claims brought by unauthorized
immigrants, encouraging employers to argue that the scope of Hoffman's
expansion remains undetermined. For employers, this substantive ambigu-
ity justifies questions about immigration status.
1. Wage and Hour Law: Hoffman Inapplicable
Nearly every court to reach the issue of Hoffman's relevance to wage
and hour law has ruled that unauthorized immigrants may still assert
claims for unpaid wages. 4 6 Allowing unauthorized immigrants to assert
claims for unpaid wages does not offend Hoffman because of different
meanings given to the term "backpay" by courts interpreting the NLRA and
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the federal law guaranteeing mini-
mum wage and overtime payments to most employees. 4 7
The type of "backpay" involved in Hoffman concerned unpaid wages
for "lost work."'4 8 Jose Castro sought damages for wages that he never
44. See, e.g., Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
45. REBECCA SMITH ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: PRESERVING RIGHTS AND REME-
DIES AFTER Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 1 (2003), available at http://
www.nelp.org/docUploads/wlghoffO4O3O3%2Epdf; Martinez, supra note 8, at 681-82
(summarizing the post-Hoffman expansion argument that "undocumented workers were
thus completely precluded from employment rights and all corresponding remedies");
O'Donovan, supra note 8, at 300; see also Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802
N.Y.S.2d 56, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (stating that the broadest reading of Hoffman
would bar all employment claims brought by unauthorized immigrants).
46. Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2006);
Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 323 ("[Tlhis Court only joins the growing chorus acknowl-
edging the right of undocumented workers to seek relief for work already performed
under the FLSA."); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501-03 (W.D.
Mich. 2005); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01 Civ. 1241, 2003 WL 22519678, at
*6 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003); Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 Civ. 6320, 2002 WL
31175471, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Rodriguez v. Texan, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 1478, 2002 WL 31061237, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2002); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Flores
v. Albertsons, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 00515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
2002); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Coma Corp.
v. Kansas Dept. of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1087 (Kan. 2007); City Plan Dev., Inc. v. Office
of Labor Comm'r, 117 P.3d 182, 189-90 (Nev. 2005); Pineda v. Kel-Tech Const., Inc.,
832 N.Y.S.2d 386, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Garcia v. Pasquareto, 812 N.Y.S.2d 216,
217 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Gomez v. Falco, 792 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. App. Term 2004).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
48. See Flores, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (distinguishing between "undocumented work-
ers seeking backpay for wages actually earned and those seeking backpay for work not
performed"); Zeng Liu, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 192; Pineda, 832 N.Y'S.2d at 395; Garcia, 812
N.Y.S.2d at 216 (allowing recovery of "unpaid wages for work that undocumented aliens
have performed when the undocumented aliens have also tendered false documents").
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earned because he was discharged illegally for union organizing. 49 The
Supreme Court held that awarding Castro backpay would offend the IRCA
because it would "trivialize[ I the immigration laws" and "encourage[ I
future violations. '5 0 On the latter point, the Court noted that in order to
comply with his required duty to mitigate, Castro would have to obtain
replacement work, thereby engaging in additional document fraud in viola-
tion of the IRCA.51
"Backpay" under the FLSA does not require the employee to find
replacement work because the term refers to payment for "work already
performed."5 2 Thus, the FLSA allows an employee to recover unpaid mini-
mum wages already earned from past work completed. Such a backpay
award does not encourage a violation of the IRCA because there is no duty
to mitigate through reemployment. Backpay awards under the FLSA
remain available to unauthorized immigrants in nearly every jurisdiction
because, other than sharing the label "backpay," FLSA claims are wholly
distinct from the monetary award involved in Hoffman.
The few courts to extend Hoffman to claims for unpaid wages have
ignored the distinction between "past work" and "lost work." In New York,
a landscaper sued his employer for unpaid wages.5 3 Finding that the
employment relationship was "tainted with illegality" because the employee
was an unauthorized immigrant, the court barred the plaintiff from recov-
ering overtime. 54 In Los Angeles, four Latino immigrants sued their
employer for failing to comply with the state's prevailing wage statute in
compensating them for their services on a public works project. 55 The
plaintiffs refused to answer discovery questions about their immigration
status. Citing Hoffman, the trial court declared that the unauthorized
immigrants had no standing to sue under California's labor laws. 56 The
court also struck down as preempted by the IRCA the California legisla-
ture's post-Hoffman attempt to extend the state's labor, employment, civil
rights, and employee housing laws to unauthorized immigrants. 57
49. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 141-42 (2002).
50. Id. at 150.
51. Id. ("Similarly, Castro cannot mitigate damages, a duty our cases require without
triggering new IRCA violations, either by tendering false documents to employers or by
finding employers willing to ignore IRCA and hire illegal workers.") (citations omitted).
52. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 322 (D.NJ. 2005) ("In
Hoffman, the plaintiffs sought recovery for the hours that they would have, but had not,
worked, had they not been terminated for engaging in protected, union-related activities.
Here, Plaintiffs hope to recover under the FLSA for work that they already have
performed.").
53. Ulloa v. Al's All Tree Serv., Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 556 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003)
(allowing unauthorized immigrant to recover no more than the minimum wage).
54. Id. at 558 (noting that if an employee produced false documents when hired,
"Hoffman would require that the wage claim be disallowed in its entirety").
55. Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing
procedural history).
56. Id. at 71.
57. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3339(a), (c) (West 2007); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7285(a) (West
2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24000 (West 2007); CAL. LaB. CODE § 1171.5(a)
(West 2007).
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Although the California Court of Appeal reversed, 58 the lower court's will-
ingness to use the plaintiff's silence to determine their status and then to
extend Hoffman to defeat their wage claims exemplifies the willingness of a
minority of courts to broaden Hoffman to employment claims far removed
from the NLRA. 5 9
2. Anti-discrimination Law and Damages for Lost Work
Hoffman cast doubt on the remedies available to unauthorized immi-
grants under federal anti-discrimination laws, including Tide VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,60 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 6 1 the Equal Pay Act,62 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 63 all of which are enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Although the Supreme Court considered the issue
during oral argument 64 and was urged by some employer groups to insti-
tute a wide ban on backpay under all anti-discrimination statutes,6 5 the
Court did not address Title VII in its opinion. Nevertheless, actions taken
by the EEOC and a few courts following Hoffman cast doubt on the contin-
58. Reyes, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 78-79.
59. See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003) (allowing recovery for FLSA retaliation, except for backpay).
But see Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (allowing recovery
for FLSA retaliation, including backpay).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
64. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595). The discussion of the issue at oral argument
proceeded as follows:
QUESTION: So in Title VII, if she were laid off, say, because they laid off all the
women before they laid off any men, so she would also have a duty to mitigate in
those circumstances, would the result be different?
MR. McCORTNEY: No. When there's a duty to mitigate which requires them to
seek interim employment, that is where the rub is, but under Title VII, under,
like, the NLRA, there's a whole array of other remedies available to enforce com-
pliance. Punitive damages, you can-compensatory damages, emotional dis-
tress, that is not dependent on the victim's authorization to work in this
country.
QUESTION: Of course, her complaint, if it were complaint, should read some-
thing like, you know, I shouldn't have been working at all, and it was illegal for
me to be working at all, and I'm complaining because I only got $12,000 in
illegal wages. I should have gotten $14,000 in illegal wages. I don't find that a
very appealing case anyway. Do you find that an appealing case?
MR. McCORTNEY: No, Your Honor, I don't. I don't find that an appealing case.
Id.
65. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and LPA, Inc.
in Support of Petitioner at 18, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1480578.
("The Court should clarify that under IRCA, undocumented aliens are not entitled to
backpay under the NLRA-or any of the other federal anti-discrimination laws, such as
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) .... ") (citations omitted); see also Christopher Ho & Jennifer C.
Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for
Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. LJ. 473, 497-98 (2005) (discussing the Hoffman oral argument).
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uing availability of backpay for unauthorized immigrants under federal
anti-discrimination statutes.
Soon after Hoffman, the EEOC rescinded its prior enforcement gui-
dance,6 6 which had stated that unauthorized immigrants were entitled to
all forms of monetary relief under federal anti-discrimination laws.67 The
EEOC stated that its former guidance was based on federal court decisions
extending backpay to unauthorized immigrants under the NLRA.68
Because of Hoffman, the EEOC could no longer declare affirmatively that
unauthorized immigrants were entitled to recover backpay for Title VII
violations.
Most courts have not treated the rescission as an explicit signal to
limit the range of Title VII remedies available to unauthorized immigrants.
These courts have noted-usually in response to discovery requests seeking
information regarding the plaintifPs immigration status-that Title VII
relies on enforcement and remedial schemes distinct from the NLRA, mak-
ing Hoffman inapplicable.6 9 Although Hoffman has not affected Title VII in
most instances, a few courts have relied on the decision to dismiss discrim-
ination claims brought by unauthorized immigrants. In Escobar v. Spartan
Security Service, a security officer claimed that his supervisor sexually
harassed him and retaliated against him after rebuffing the advances. 70
Noting that the plaintiff was an unauthorized immigrant at the time of hire,
the court dismissed his claim for lost wages under Title VII. 7 1 Although
the court did not state its reasoning, implicit in the decision was the past
work/lost work distinction discussed above. 72 Although backpay awards
under most wage statutes involve payment for work already performed, lost
wages under the NLRA and Title VII typically involve payment for work lost
due to the defendant's unlawful acts. 73 Thus, the same problems of mitiga-
tion and future IRCA violations present in Hoffman arguably exist in these
66. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance on Remedies
Available to Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws,
EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Oct. 26, 1999, rescinded June 27, 2002, available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html.
67. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, Rescission of Enforcement Guidance on
Remedies Available to Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination
Laws, EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 915.002, June 27, 2002, available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html.
68. Id.
69. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. First
Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (following Rivera and
denying discovery of charging parties' immigration status); see De La Rosa v. N. Harvest
Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237 (C.D. 111. 2002).
70. Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
71. Id. at 897 ("Hoffman only compels the conclusion that Escobar is not entitled to
backpay on his claims under Title VII, such a remedy being foreclosed by the fact that he
was an undocumented worker at the time he was employed by Spartan.").
72. See supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying discussion on backpay awards under the
FLSA.
73. See Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2006)
(suggesting that Hoffman "may preclude an award of backpay" for lost work under Title
VII); Smith et al., supra note 13, at 606 (noting the difference between "backpay" under
the FLSA and other employment statutes).
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situations. 74
In New Jersey, Rosa Crespo alleged that her employer violated the
state's anti-discrimination law by firing her because she was pregnant. 75
The state appellate court held that as an unauthorized immigrant, Crespo
was completely barred from asserting a claim for pregnancy discrimina-
tion.76 Feeling bound by "Hoffman's strong enforcement of the policies
served by IRCA," the court held that Crespo's "statutory bar from employ-
ment" precluded recovery under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimina-
tion.7 7 This is a remarkable outcome given that the Supreme Court in
Hoffman reaffirmed its prior holding that unauthorized immigrants are
"employees" under the NLRA and are therefore covered by the Act. 7 8 Fol-
lowing Hoffman, the Department of Labor, the NLRB, and the EEOC stated
unequivocally that federal employment laws still cover unauthorized immi-
grants. 79 Although the availability of backpay under these statutes remains
debatable, coverage has never been at issue. There is no coherent reading
of Hoffman that would restrict federal or state anti-discrimination statutes
to citizens.
3. State Law: Torts and Workers' Compensation
Although most scholars have focused on Hoffman's impact on federal
wage and anti-discrimination laws, state courts have cited Hoffman in per-
sonal injury, wrongful death, wrongful discharge, and workers' compensa-
tion cases. Although still in the minority,8 0 some state courts have relied
74. FLSA retaliation claims can involve backpay for lost work. Although few courts
have addressed the availability of this type of backpay to unauthorized immigrants after
Hoffman, at least one court has allowed backpay for past work but denied an award of
backpay for lost work. See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 495, 2003 WL
21995190, at *6 (N.D. Il. Aug. 21, 2003). But see Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056,
1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
75. Crespo v. Evergro Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 473 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
76. Id. at 476-77.
77. Id. at 477 (leaving open the possibility that an unauthorized immigrant could
recover for "aggravated sexual harassment" or "other egregious circumstances").
78. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144-45 (2002) (citing
Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984)).
79. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 67 ("The Supreme Court's
decision in Hoffman in no way calls into question the settled principle that undocu-
mented workers are covered by the federal employment discrimination statutes."); Mem-
orandum GC 02-06 from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Regional
Dirs., Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers, Procedures and Remedies for Dis-
criminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
(July 19, 2002), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedjfiles/GC%20Memos/2002/
gcO2-06.html ("[Ijt is unassailable that all statutory employees, including undocumented
workers, enjoy protections from unfair labor practices .... ); Application of U.S. Labor
Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the
Wage and Hour Division, FACT SHEET (U.S. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2007, available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/whd/
whdfs48.htm ("The Department's Wage and Hour Division will continue to enforce the
FLSA and MSPA [Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act] without
regard to whether an employee is documented or undocumented.").
80. For cases refusing to extend Hoffman to tort claims involving lost earnings, see
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
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on Hoffman to bar unauthorized immigrants from recovering damages for
lost wages.8 1 For example, in Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, an unautho-
rized immigrant was en route to North Carolina from Mexico when his van
was involved in a three-car accident in Kansas, causing the plaintiff severe
back injuries and limiting his ability to work.82 Describing the plaintiff as
"engage[d] in a conspiracy to transport illegal aliens," the court, applying
Kansas tort law, cited Hoffman and dismissed the plaintiffs claim for lost
future earnings.8 3
In Veliz v. Rental Service Corp., Felipe Valdivia Ignacio was killed in a
forklift accident at a construction site in Florida.8 4 Ignacio's estate
asserted a products liability action against the leasing company and manu-
facturer of the forklift and sought, inter alia, damages for the decedent's
lost future wages.8 5 Citing Hoffman and finding that "Mr. Ignacio unlaw-
fully subverted the IRCA's enforcement mechanisms by tendering fraudu-
lent identification to obtain employment," a Florida state court dismissed
the estate's claim for lost support.8 6 The court noted that in addition to
offending national immigration policy and condoning past immigration
violations, an award of lost wages "would be tantamount to violating the
IRCA."8 7
As with tort law, most state courts addressing the issue of workers'
compensation have extended coverage to unauthorized immigrants follow-
ing Hoffman.8 8 Nevertheless, several courts have relied on Hoffman to limit
Hernandez v. Paicius, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 760-762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (medical
malpractice); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006) (negli-
gence); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 66 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (negligence); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 247 (Tex. App.
2003); see also Ho & Chang, supra note 65, at 497-98 (summarizing the development of
tort law following Hoffman).
81. For cases extending Hoffman to tort claims involving lost wages, see Rosa v. Part-
ners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1001-02 (N.H. 2005) (finding Hoffman "instruc-
tive" and holding that "generally an illegal alien may not recover lost United States
earnings, because such earnings may be realized only if that illegal alien engages in
unlawful employment"); Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003) (allowing jury to consider plaintiffs unauthorized status); see also Megan A. Reyn-
olds, Immigration-Related Discovery After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:
Examining Defending Employers' Knowledge of Plaintiffs' Immigration Status, 2005 MICH.
ST. L. REv 1261, 1279 (2005) (summarizing unsuccessful common law claims brought
by unauthorized immigrants following Hoffman).
82. Hernandez-Cortezv. Hernandez, No. 01 Civ. 1241, 2003 WL 22519678, at *2-4
(D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003).
83. Id. at *4.
84. Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (M.D. Fla.
2003).
85. Id. at 1334-35.
86. Id. at 1335-37.
87. Id. at 1336.
88. Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 23, 29-30
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Safeharbor Employer Servs. I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So. 2d
984, 986 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003); Earth First Grading & Builders Ins. Group/Ass'n Serv.,
Inc. v. Gutierrez, 606 S.E.2d 332, 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (extending workers' compen-
sation benefits to unauthorized immigrants and noting that a "contrary holding would
reward employers for hiring illegal aliens"); Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 882 A.2d
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the ability of unauthorized immigrants to recover workers' compensation
benefits.8 9 These decisions reflect a muddled understanding of federalism
and a confused application of federal preemption rules.90 Nevertheless,
they define a new legal landscape in which the employment rights and rem-
edies available to plaintiffs depend on immigration status.
B. The Unauthorized Immigrant's Ambiguous Place in Employment
Law
It will likely take decades to determine the impact of the post-Hoffman
expansion movement on employment laws.9 ' Although some commenta-
tors contend that courts have largely "tempered" Hoffman's ripple effect, 92
others argue that, absent congressional intervention, Hoffman will likely
eliminate unauthorized immigrants' ability to receive reinstatement or
backpay under most federal employment statutes. 93 Given that Hoffman
was only the second Supreme Court decision to address the employment
rights of unauthorized immigrants,9 4 the lower courts are unlikely to clar-
ify these issues in the foreseeable future.9 5
The inhibiting effect resulting from the expansion movement will arise
not from the movement's limited substantive success but from the status-
817, 830 (Md. 2005); Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 329-30
(Minn. 2003); Ruiz v. Belk Masonry, 559 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Rajeh v.
Steel City Corp, 813 N.E.2d 697, 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Cherokee Indus., Inc. v.
Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798, 801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); see also O'Donovan, supra note 8, at
304-07.
89. Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (claimant is no
longer eligible for workers' compensation wage loss benefits upon discovery of claim-
ant's unauthorized immigration status); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal
Bd., 810 A.2d 99 (Pa. 2002) (claimant's unauthorized immigration status makes him
"unavailable" for work and justifies suspension of benefits); Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir.
295 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) (citing the IRCA and holding that "[p]laintiffs current legal
status is potentially dispositive as to whether he may recover under the Virginia Work-
ers' Compensation Law").
90. See infra Part III.E.3 and accompanying discussion on federal preemption and
adverse inferences.
91. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 516 (2004).
92. See Beth L. Throne, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Empowering the
Unscrupulous Employer and Stigmatizing the Undocumented Worker, 17 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. LJ. 595, 606 (2003).
93. See Wishnie, supra note 91, at 508. But see infra Part III.E and accompanying
discussion on Hoffman's limited relevance to other employment statutes.
94. Wishnie, supra note 91, at 498-99 (referring to Hoffman as possibly "the most
important recent development in the lives of immigrant workers"). The first decision
was Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that
unauthorized immigrants who are no longer present in the United States are not "availa-
ble for work" and therefore ineligible for an award of backpay under the NLRA. Id. at
884.
95. See Martinez, supra note 8, at 692 ("[Uintil the Supreme Court or Congress
revisits the logic behind this decision, it will continue to be conveniently stretched and
analogized by employers."); Reynolds, supra note 81, at 1280 (noting that "defendants
have seized upon the language in Hoffman to support arguments that make immigration
status relevant to every imaginable claim and, therefore, demanded discovery on this
matter").
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based inquiries made possible by lawyers arguing for Hoffman's application
to other employment claims. In a world where Hoffman arguably limits the
recovery of unauthorized immigrants, status matters. Without an effective
strategy for answering the status-based questions born of Hoffman, immi-
grants will continue to opt out of civil litigation,9 6 unwilling to assert even
the strongest claims for workplace violations.
9 7
II. Discovery and Immigrant Opt-Out
Before becoming a member of the Supreme Court and joining the Hoff-
man majority, then-Judge Anthony Kennedy wrote that courts must extend
labor protections to unauthorized immigrants, lest they "leave helpless the
very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer prac-
tices."9 Most scholarly attention paid to Hoffman has misconstrued the
decision's significance by focusing on Hoffman's impact on the rights and
remedies available to unauthorized immigrants. In fact, the decision will
be remembered most for legalizing exploitative discovery practices that
undermine workplace rights.9 9 Hoffman and its progeny provided employ-
ers with a "prying device" 100 that allows employers to achieve ends in liti-
gation that remain illegal in the workplace. For example, it remains
unlawful for an employer to report a plaintiff to immigration officials' 0 1 in
retaliation for workplace complaints. Because of the status-based discovery
made possible by Hoffman, employers can implicitly threaten deportation
in depositions and document requests without violating anti-retaliation
employment protections. The same is true for discrimination based on
race and national origin. Defendants can now use race-based and accent-
based factors in selectively posing immigration-related discovery questions
to certain plaintiffs. The distinctions that the employer is prohibited from
drawing in the terms and conditions of employment become operative in
the terms and conditions of litigation.
In the following section, I summarize employers' widespread use of
status-based discovery following Hoffman. These new methods of immi-
96. See Cleveland et al., supra note 38, at 796; Connie de la Vega & Conchita
Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use Applicable International Standards to Address Viola-
tions of Undocumented Migrant Workers' Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 35, 49 (2005).
97. See Cleveland et al., supra note 38, at 801-02; Throne, supra note 92, at 605
(noting that Hoffman has "made immigration status relevant to an immigrant worker's
standing to even bring a well-substantiated claim against his or her former employer").
98. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
99. See Developments in the Law-jobs and Borders, supra note 13, at 2234 (noting
that "the crucial point of leverage" created by Hoffman "lies not in removing one category
of damages, but in adding a new category of discovery").
100. See Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposa-
ble Workers, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA LJ. 103, 146 (2003) (describing discovery following
Hoffnan).
101. On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed the
functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). See 6 U.S.C.
§ 542 (2000); see also Yerkovich v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990, 991 (10th Cir. 2004).
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grant exploitation are perfectly legal and highly effective at maintaining a
submissive workforce. This outcome not only dissuades immigrants, both
legal and unauthorized, from righting workplace wrongs, it diminishes
employment protections that depend on enforcement from a broad section
of the workforce.
A. Losing Immigrants, Harming Citizens
In conjunction with their arguments that Hoffman applies to all types
of employment claims, employers have adopted aggressive discovery prac-
tices designed to uncover plaintiffs' immigration status. In California, Juan
Flores represented a class of janitors who alleged that Albertsons, Safeway,
and other supermarkets failed to pay workers overtime and other wages. 10 2
The supermarkets served Flores with the following document request:
"Each and every [document] describing, reflecting, referring to or relating
to the immigration status of [Flores], including but not limited to 1-9
forms."'1 3 In a class action that immigrant garment workers in New York
brought for unpaid minimum wages, Donna Karan International sought
discovery of the plaintiffs' immigration status. 10 4 Hilton Hotels demanded
to know the immigration status of a steamfitter who sued to recover lost
earnings after sustaining an injury at the New York Hilton. 0 5
Defendants now pose status-based questions to immigrant employees
as a matter of course.' 0 6 The stated purpose of these requests is to pursue
the defendant's argument that Hoffman imposes new remedial limitations
on unauthorized immigrants. More important, however, the questions
send an ominous signal to the plaintiff immigrant: If you continue to assert
your workplace rights, you will reveal your illegal presence in the United
States and risk deportation. 10 7 Faced with this choice, the unauthorized
immigrant will often choose to walk away. 10 8
102. Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 00515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2002).
103. Id. at *6 (denying the discovery request).
104. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
105. Asgar-Ali v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 114451/02, 2004 WL 2127230, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 6, 2004) ("[Ulntil plaintiff filed suit, there is no indication in the record
that Hilton expressed an interest in determining employment authorizations.").
106. See Ho & Chang, supra note 65, at 475 (describing the requests as "nearly rou-
tine"); Martinez, supra note 8, at 692 (noting that Hoffman has "given employers an
unjustified conviction that they have a right to use the discovery process to disclose a
worker's immigration status"); see also NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 6
(referring to a "sharp rise" in status-based requests).
107. Zeng Liu, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (referring to "the danger of intimidation, the
danger of destroying the cause of action" posed by status-based discovery); EEOC v.
Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Flores, 2002 WL
1163623, at *6 ("It is entirely likely that any undocumented class member forced to
produce documents related to his or her immigration status will withdraw from the suit
rather than produce such documents and face termination and/or potential
deportation.").
108. See Ho & Chang, supra note 65, at 475; Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, From Hoffman
Plastic to the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: Protecting Undocumented Workers' Rights
Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 601, 604 (2004).
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Unauthorized immigrants are acutely aware of their tenuous presence
in the United States. 10 9 Long before Hoffman, the greatest force preventing
immigrants from asserting employment claims was the unavoidable associ-
ation of complaining with removal-a consequence far more life-altering
than mere discharge. Even without the prospect of status-based questions
clouding litigation, unauthorized immigrants often chose to remain silent
in the face of egregious workplace violations.' 10 The fear is justified; stud-
ies suggest that immigration raids are more likely to occur at workplaces
where immigrants have lodged complaints. 1'
In addition to causing unauthorized immigrants to abandon litigation,
questions about status dissuade lawful permanent residents from going to
court. These legal immigrants often live in "mixed families" in which some
family members are U.S. citizens and others are unauthorized immi-
grants. 1 2 If litigating workplace claims entails extensive discovery about
status, many of these legal immigrants will decline to sue in order to avoid
answering invasive questions about their families and themselves. 1 13
The opt-out phenomena caused by status-based discovery reaches a
sizable percentage of the workforce. Immigrants represent roughly 15% of
the civilian labor force, 114 accounting for nearly one-half of the growth of
the workforce between 1990 and 2001.115 With more than 400,000 unau-
thorized immigrants coming to the country annually,1 16 they now eclipse
109. See generally DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF
MIGRANT FARMWORKERS TODAY xiv (1998) (referring to "an entire class of unprotected
and unrecognized laborers deeply aware of their powerlessness and vulnerability"); see
also Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857, 865
(2007) (referring to the "inherently precarious" existence of undocumented
immigrants).
110. See NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 6 at 2; de la Vega & Lozano-
Batista, supra note 96, at 40-44 (describing working conditions of migrant workers in
the United States).
111. See Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The Border Crossed US: Current Issues in
Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 389, 390-92 (2004) (summarizing
data showing a correlation between INS raids in New York and state labor complaints);
see also COMPA, supra note 39, at 30 (reporting on employers' threats to call the INS in
retaliation for unionization drives by immigrant workers).
112. See PASSEL, supra note 7, at 17-18 (estimating 13.9 million persons living in
unauthorized migrant families).
113. Ho & Chang, supra note 65, at 525 (noting that status-based discovery would
"undeniably weaken [immigrants'] resolve to see their cases through to their end").
114. STEPHEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
STATES-2002: A SNAPSHOT OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 11 (2002), available
at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/backl302.pdf; see also Michael R. Brown, Hoffman
Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: The First Step?, 19 LAB. LAW. 169, 171 (2003) (describing
Hoffman's impact on the growing immigrant labor market).
115. CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUDIES, NORTHEASTERN UNIV., IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE
GREAT AMERICAN JOB MACHINE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW FOREIGN IMMIGRATION TO
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LABOR FORCE GROWTH IN THE 1990s 27 (2002).
116. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2005 1
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL_
PE-2005.pdf.
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the number of new legal immigrants. 1t 7
Beyond unauthorized immigrants, status-based discovery also harms
citizens by diminishing litigation market conditions. The Supreme Court
has stated that unauthorized immigrants' willingness to accept lower wages
depresses market pay rates and harms working conditions for citizens.' 18
Although economists and policymakers debate this conclusion, there is no
doubt that an immigrant applicant holds some competitive advantage in
the labor market over a similarly situated citizen if the only difference
between the two is their willingness to someday assert workplace claims.
As a growing segment of the workforce refuses to sue for employment law
violations, citizens who complain become more costly relative to their
silent immigrant coworkers. In addition, immigrants' unwillingness to sue
weakens the enforcement scheme of many employment statutes. 11 9 From
combating sweatshop conditions' 20 to investigating labor law violations 121
and enforcing wage laws, ' 22 many federal agencies rely almost entirely on
employee complaints. For example, federal anti-discrimination statutes
depend on private attorneys general to assert claims in court to promote
nondiscrimination in the workforce, "a policy of the highest priority."'123
Continued unabated, the current rate of Hoffman-caused immigrant opt-out
will eventually clear the courts of most immigrants, leaving unreported
"countless acts of illegal and reprehensible conduct." 124
B. Effective Race and National Origin Discrimination
In addition to harming immigrants and disincentivizing citizen-initi-
ated employment litigation, status-based discovery enables employers to
discriminate and retaliate against immigrants in the courtroom in ways
strictly forbidden in the workplace. Title VII protects immigrants from
workplace discrimination based on, among other factors, language and
race. 125 Likewise, the IRCA contains its own anti-discrimination provi-
117. PASSEL, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that beginning in 1995 the annual number of
new unauthorized immigrants exceeded the annual number of new legal immigrants).
118. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (discussing the effects of
illegal immigration on wages, working conditions, and labor unions).
119. See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of
Labor Protections and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 347 (2001)
(explaining how the exclusion of undocumented workers from employment protections
harms all employees).
120. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GARMENT INDUSTRY: EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE
PREVALENCE AND CONDITIONS OF SWEATSHOPS 3 (1994), available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1995/he95029.pdf.
121. See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972); see also Wishnie, supra note
91, at 518 (discussing the crucial role of worker complaints in agency enforcement).
122. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) ("Plainly,
effective enforcement [of the FLSA] could thus only be expected if employees felt free to
approach officials with their grievances.").
123. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995); N.Y.
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (discussing private enforcement of Title
V1I).
124. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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sion, the goal of which is to prevent employers from differentiating among
foreign-looking and foreign-sounding applicants. 12 6 By allowing employers
to randomly subject certain plaintiff immigrants to status-based inquiries
during litigation, Hoffman enables employers to lawfully achieve ends in
discovery that Title VII prohibits in employment.
Because discovery is party-driven and molded by the contours of each
-case, there is no uniform set of interrogatories, document requests, or dep-
osition questions posed to all plaintiff employees. The defending employer
maintains almost complete discretion over the questions he asks during
litigation. Given this freedom, the employer will not pose status-based
questions to all plaintiffs, but only to those who the employer believes are
foreign-born. 1 27 What criteria do employers use to determine when immi-
gration-related questions are warranted and when they are not? Although
an employee's job application or interview responses might furnish infor-
mation about foreign nationality, more times than not, the employer will
simply rely on her intuition in deciding whether to propound status-based
discovery. That "hunch" will almost invariably be informed by the
employee's language, accent, or skin color. The same pernicious cues the
employer is prohibited from considering in employment become the basis
of the employer's Hoffman-inspired discovery. Thus, in addition to elimi-
nating immigrants as a class of potential Title VII enforcers, status-based
discovery facilitates an end-run around the core protections of the stat-
ute. 1 28 The immigrant employee is told that she is protected from race
discrimination in the workplace, but upon filing a complaint alleging such
discrimination, she is subjected to intimidating discovery based on racial
cues, thereby undermining the very statute that she attempts to enforce.
C. Implied Retaliation
Nearly all federal employment statutes contain parallel anti-retaliation
provisions. 1 29 These laws would collapse in the absence of protections for
complaining employees. Courts have long held that employers who call
immigration officials to quell workplace complaints violate anti-retaliation
protections. 130 Merely threatening deportation without actually contact-
126. See Juan P. Osuna, Breaking New Ground: The 1996 Immigration Act's Provisions
on Work Verification and Employer Sanctions, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 329, 333 (1997) (sum-
marizing the IRCA's anti-discrimination provisions).
127. See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences
of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEx. Hisp. J.L. & PoL'Y 45, 55
(2005).
128. See Ho & Chang, supra note 65, at 525 (arguing that status-based discovery
strongly deters immigrants from asserting national origin discrimination claims).
129. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000) (FLSA anti-retaliation provision); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (Title VII anti-retaliation provision); NLRB v. Del Rey Tortil-
leria, Inc., 787 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding unlawful retaliation under the
NLRA).
130. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898 (1984) (holding that an
employer committed an unfair labor practice by reporting five union supporters to the
INS).
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ing immigration officials may constitute prohibited retaliation as well.13 1
For example, in Singh v. Jutla,132 Macan Singh, an unauthorized immi-
grant, sued his employer for unpaid wages. Singh alleged that his uncle
recruited him from India to work at a gas station in California. After work-
ing twelve-hour shifts, seven days per week for three years without pay,
Singh sued his uncle. The day after the parties settled Singh's wage claims
for $69,000, the uncle reported Singh to the INS, which arrested and
detained Singh for fifteen months.13 3 In a subsequent action alleging FLSA
retaliation, Singh recovered $40,000 in damages for pain and suffering and
$160,000 in punitive damages after the trial court ruled that Hoffman did
not preclude unauthorized immigrants from asserting FLSA retaliation
claims. 134
Although anti-retaliation provisions still prevent employers from con-
tacting immigration officials in reprisal for workplace complaints, an
employer can now accurately remind a prospective plaintiff of the
employer's ability to inquire into the employee's immigration status should
she decide to commence litigation. 13 5 The threat to call immigration offi-
cials is illegal, but the threat to depose a worker about her status is permis-
sible. In effect, Hoffman enables employers to raise the specter of
deportation without breaking the law. 136
From a narrow decision involving one type of remedy available in an
administrative labor proceeding, Hoffman has morphed into a blunt discov-
ery weapon that weakens our nation's entire system of employment protec-
tions for immigrant workers. 13 7 The loss of immigrants and the harm to
employment laws will continue until immigrants adopt an effective strategy
for responding to post-Hoffman discovery.
III. Status, Silence, and the Fifth Amendment
Unauthorized immigrants rarely invoke the Fifth Amendment to
defend against status-based discovery. Their unwillingness to claim the
privilege against self-incrimination is driven by the misperception that
invocation "criminalizes" the civil process. As a result, immigrant-rights
advocates scrambling to respond to the challenges posed by status-based
discovery have largely failed to formulate an internally coherent strategy
131. See Orrin Baird, Undocumented Workers and the NLRA: Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds and Beyond, 19 LAB. LAw. 153, 161 (2003) (noting that reporting or threatening
to report workers to immigration officials violates the NLRA).
132. Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
133. Bob Egelko, Jury Awards $200,000 to Illegal Immigrant, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20,
2003, at A3.
134. Id.; see also Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
135. See Annie Decker, Comment, Suspending Employers' Immigration-Related Duties
During Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal, 115 YALE L.J. 2193, 2199 (2006) (describ-
ing the chilling effect of status-based document requests).
136. See Martinez, supra note 8, at 673 (discussing the implied retaliation of status-
based discovery).
137. See id. at 665; see also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir.
2004) (arguing that status-based questions contain the implicit threat of deportation).
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for addressing their clients' competing needs: protection from intimidation
and vindication of substantive employment rights. I contend that the Fifth
Amendment provides a method for achieving both ends.
My argument in favor of the privilege begins by explaining the limita-
tions of the protective order-the most common strategy employed by law-
yers responding to status-based discovery. Protective orders do not
effectively curb the broad inhibiting effects of status-based discovery. In
addition, the orders fail to serve immigrants' litigation interests in anonym-
ity, consistency, and certainty. This outcome not only diminishes the
plaintiffs confidence in the process, as well as her sense of security, but
also discourages potential immigrant litigants from coming to court know-
ing that they will quite likely confront invasive status-based discovery.
I argue that the privilege against self-incrimination is a far more effec-
tive-though almost completely unutilized-method for addressing ques-
tions about status. I begin by considering the language, history, and
purpose of the Fifth Amendment as applied to civil litigation brought by
unauthorized immigrants. The privilege is said to prevent a witness from
facing the "cruel trilemma" of perjury, self-incrimination, and con-
tempt. 138 Thus, absent the privilege, witnesses would be forced to choose
between deceit, penalized admission, and penalized silence. The privilege
eliminates the "cruel choice," thus facilitating a more humane criminal
prosecution. While responding to critics who question whether this and
other policies underlying the Fifth Amendment carry much weight in the
civil context, I argue that the cruel choice theory plays a prominent role in
immigrant-initiated civil litigation. In addition to facing the possibility of
criminal prosecution, unauthorized immigrants risk removal from the
United States should they testify about their status. Thus, the unautho-
rized immigrant faces a cruel trilemma with a twist. Truth carries the pri-
mary consequence of criminal prosecution and the collateral consequence
of deportation. The latter penalty, which is unique to this class of wit-
nesses, increases the harshness of a forced choice, thus strengthening the
case for extending the privilege to unauthorized immigrants asserting
workplace claims. As explained below, the privilege's other underlying pol-
icies, including privacy, individualism, and fair criminal process, also
counsel in favor of allowing unauthorized immigrants to invoke the
privilege.
After outlining the policy reasons for extending the privilege to unau-
thorized immigrants in civil cases, I explain the procedures for invoking
the privilege and the potential costs of invocation. Chief among the poten-
tial costs is the adverse inference that a court may draw from a witness's
silence. Although the adverse inference is an intuitively attractive measure
for counter-balancing the apparent advantage the immigrant gains from
invocation, I argue that upon closer examination, courts should not draw
138. See Heidt, supra note 16, at 1084-87. But see HenryJ. Friendly, The Fifth Amend-
ment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 694-95
(1968) (criticizing the rationale).
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the inference in most instances because a plaintiffs unauthorized status is
irrelevant to the majority of employment claims.
Even if a court draws a negative inference from the plaintiffs silence, I
assert that the result is more consistent with plaintiff immigrants' litigation
interests than the current state of affairs. By forcing the court to rule on
the issue of adverse inferences, the invocation allows for a clear enuncia-
tion of Hoffman's relevance to the claims at issue. As immigrant-initiated
employment litigation stands today, employers pose status-based ques-
tions, immigrants hide behind protective orders, and courts write cryptic
decisions alluding to Hoffman's "possible" relevance. In contrast, the
model proposed here clarifies immigrants' legal rights by requiring infer-
ence decisions that cannot occur until courts first make a clear pronounce-
ment on Hoffman's effect, if any, on the claims at issue.139
A. Inadequate Alternatives
Faced with Hoffman-inspired questions about status, immigrants most
commonly seek protective orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c). In its broadest form, the protective order bars defense counsel from
making any discovery request related to the plaintiffs immigration
status.140
In cases involving plaintiff immigrants who seek protection from sta-
tus-based questions, courts have balanced the public and private interests
in the enforcement of employment protections against the employer's need
to know the plaintiffs status. 141 The more evidentiary value the court
places on status, the more reticent the court will be to issue the protective
order. Courts tend to prohibit status-based inquiries during the liability
phase of discrimination cases 142 and throughout wage cases. 143 Neverthe-
139. See, e.g., Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 Civ. 10010, 2002 WL 1941484, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) ("[If plaintiff were to admit to being in the United States ille-
gally, or were to refuse to answer questions regarding his status on the grounds that it is
not relevant, then the issue of his standing would properly be before us, and we would
address the issue of whether Hoffman Plastics applies to ADA claims for compensatory
and punitive damages brought by undocumented aliens.").
140. See, e.g., SMITH ET AL., supra note 45, at 19 (recommending protective orders); Ho
& Chang, supra note 65, at 519 (same); Martinez, supra note 8, at 688-89 (same); see
also Peter J. Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Discovery:
The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U.S.F. L. REV. 12, 21 (1968)
(arguing that protective orders prevent the public disclosure of incriminating informa-
tion while supporting policies of liberal discovery).
141. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1063-64, 1069 ("IT]he overriding national policy against
discrimination would seem likely to outweigh any bar against the payment of back
wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII cases."); see also Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No.
01 Civ. 00515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002).
142. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064; EEOC v. Kovacevich "5" Farms, No. 06 Civ. 0165,
2007 WL 1599772, at *3-5 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2007); Perez-Farias v. Global Horizons,
Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3061, 2007 WL 1412796, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 10, 2007); EEOC v.
First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 4990, 2007 WL 586720, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2007); EEOC v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D. Minn. 2006); Avila-Blum v.
Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); EEOC v. Bice of
Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581, 582-83 (N.D. Il. 2005); EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc.,
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less, as in cases attempting to expand Hoffman beyond the NLRA, courts
have not ruled uniformly in favor of plaintiff immigrants.
In Colorado, six Chilean cattle herders asserted wage and other claims
against their employer and sought a protective order prohibiting document
requests or deposition questions related to their immigration status.
14 4
The trial court determined that as temporary guest workers, the plaintiffs
had placed their immigration status at issue and that status-based discov-
ery was relevant to the employer's mitigation-related defenses. 145 The
court ordered the plaintiffs to state whether or not they were legal immi-
grants, holding that their privacy interests could be protected by limiting
dissemination of their answers to the parties and court.146 Other courts
have found immigration status relevant to workers' compensation and
workplace discrimination claims. 1 47 The cases thus present mixed results
in which most courts forbid status-based discovery, while others refuse to
bar immigration-related questions.
Given their tenuous status in the United States, unauthorized immi-
grants place a premium on maintaining an inconspicuous presence.
Because the public nature of litigation runs counter to this interest, the
unauthorized immigrant is naturally averse to vindicating her workplace
rights in court. Any litigation tactic that increases public attention
decreases the likelihood that the unauthorized immigrant will come to
court or remain in a lawsuit already filed.
Protective order litigation cannot be harmonized with the unautho-
rized immigrant's central concern for anonymity. In fact, the order fails to
225 F.R.D. 404, 406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D.
237, 237-39 (C.D. l11. 2002).
143. Rengifo v. Erevos Enter., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4266, 2007 WL 894376, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2007); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 FR.D. 499, 501
(W.D. Mich. 2005); Centeno-Bernuy v. Becker Farms, 219 F.R.D. 59, 61 (W.D.N.Y.
2003); Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 Civ. 6320, 2002 WL 31175471, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463-64 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); Rodriguez v. Texan, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 1478, 2002 WL 31061237, at *2 (N.D. Il1.
Sept. 16, 2002); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing plain-
tiffs immigration status as a "non-relevant matter"); N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. at
239; Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Flores, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5-6; Cabrera v. Ekema, 695 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005); NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 6, at 2-4 (summarizing discov-
ery requests following Hoffman). But see Flores v. Limehouse, No. 04 Civ. 1294, 2006
WL 1328762, at *2 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (requiring plaintiffs in wage case to disclose
their status).
144. Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship, No. 06 Civ. 01043, 2007 WL 951781,
at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2007).
145. Id. at *1-2.
146. Id. at *2.
147. Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 Civ. 10010, 2002 WL 1941484, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2002) (noting that if plaintiff were to refuse to answer status-based questions
then the court could address his standing to assert an ADA claim as an unauthorized
immigrant); Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) (describing plaintiffs
immigration status as "highly relevant" to workers' compensation claim but refusing to
compel answer due to Fifth Amendment privilege); see also NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PRO-
JECT, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that some courts "have ordered immigrant victims of
labor law violations to disclose their status").
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serve the immigrant's key litigation interests, including a desire for speedy,
consistent, and complete protection from status-based inquiries. An analy-
sis of Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc. 148 -the gold standard in protective order litiga-
tion for unauthorized immigrants-demonstrates the weak nexus between
the order and the immigrant's litigation interests. Rivera involved twenty-
three female production line workers with limited English proficiency who
alleged that their employer engaged in national origin discrimination by
requiring them to take a basic job skills examination in English-a require-
ment allegedly unrelated to actual job performance. 149 On May 14, 2001,
the employer deposed plaintiff Martha Rivera, who refused to answer ques-
tions related to her immigration status. 150 Rivera's position triggered a
series of briefs, arguments, and written opinions, eventually resulting in a
strong protective order for the plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
protective order in 2004,151 and the Supreme Court denied review in
2005.152 In sum, after four years, a dozen briefs, several hearings, and five
orders, the courts finally assured Martha Rivera that she would be "pro-
tected" from answering questions about her immigration status. The pro-
tection was undercut shortly thereafter, however, when the trial court ruled
on remand that Rivera would have to disclose her status to facilitate the
court's in camera damages calculation. 153
Unlike Rivera, most protective orders do not take years to obtain; in
jurisdictions where parties have frequently litigated post-Hoffman discov-
ery issues, courts may issue protective orders relatively quickly. Neverthe-
less, an employer who so chooses can often turn protective order litigation
into a protracted and costly legal battle.154 The extended timeline fails to
serve the plaintiff's interest in swift adjudication, further discouraging
immigrants from enforcing their workplace rights in court.
Even if a plaintiff immigrant obtains a protective order quickly, infor-
mation protected at the early stages of discovery becomes vulnerable to
disclosure as the trial nears. 15 5 For example, in Flores v. Albertsons, the
trial court denied the defendant grocery stores' efforts to discover the class
representatives' immigration status but made the ruling "without
prejudice" in order to allow the court to "revisit" the issue later in the litiga-
tion. 156 Likewise, although Donna Karan International lost its initial
attempt to discover the immigration status of the plaintiff immigrant gar-
148. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).
149. Id. at 1061.
150. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 647, 648 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
151. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1062.
152. NIBCO, Inc. v. Rivera, 544 U.S. 905 (2005).
153. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., No. Civ.-F-99-6443, 2006 WL 845925, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 2006).
154. See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1, 23 (1983) (noting that absent party consent, protective order litigation "is
often an extremely time-consuming process for the parties and the court").
155. See In re GrandJury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that
protected discovery usually surfaces at trial).
156. Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 00515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2002).
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ment workers, the court permitted the clothing designer to seek leave to
renew the discovery request at a later juncture. 15 7
Protective orders cannot meet the immigrant's interest in anonymity,
speed, or consistency when courts wait until late stages of the litigation to
determine whether status is relevant. The cases most likely to yield early
protection from status-based questions involve lost wages for past work. 158
Given the long line of decisions holding that status is irrelevant to these
claims, 15 9 courts are likely to issue broadly worded protective orders that
maintain their vigor throughout the case. The outcome is far less clear in
Title VII and other cases involving wages for lost work. The trend is to
prohibit disclosure early, while leaving open the possibility that status will
become relevant later in the litigation. 160
Courts are empowered to bar discovery of even relevant matters.161
Thus, if an employer attempts to enter the "shadow zones of relevancy"
regarding an immigrant's status, the court is well within its authority to
limit discovery, 16 2 because such disclosure would have a chilling effect on
immigrant plaintiffs. Nonetheless, given the policy of liberal discovery
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 163 courts tend to require
parties to disclose information that is even tenuously relevant. 164 If the
court ultimately determines that a plaintiffs unauthorized status elimi-
nates or significantly reduces an employer's exposure, the court is much
157. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("If it appears at some later juncture that such discovery would be relevant, and more
relevant than harmful, Donna Karan may seek leave to renew this request.").
158. Id. at 192-93; Flores, 2002 WL 1163623, at *6.
159. See supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying discussion on the past work/lost work
distinction; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 45, at 19 (referring to the growing authority
for protective orders in wage cases).
160. EEOC v. Rest. Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting that
Hoffman might preclude certain remedies but declining to rule on the issue during the
liability phase of litigation); Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277 (D.
Okla. 2006) (noting that Hoffman does not preclude the recovery of lost wages for work
performed but "may preclude an award of backpay" for lost work); EEOC v. Rest. Co.,
448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006) ("[S]uch information may become relevant
later, depending on the nature of the remedies sought."); Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio
Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting protective order but "leav-
ing open the prospect that the issue could be reopened at a later stage of the proceeding
as appropriate in relation to damages"); see also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., No. Civ.-F-99-
6443, 2006 WL 845925, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006) (authorizing in camera review
of plaintiffs' documents following liability phase of Title VII case).
161. See Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Crawford-El v. Brit-
ton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 (1998)); see also Ho & Chang, supra note 65, at 519 ("[Elven if
Hoffman made a worker's status potentially relevant to the measure of backpay, it does
not thereby confer license upon any and all efforts to discover that status.").
162. In re Surety Ass'n of Am., 388 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1967).
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.").
164. See Charles H. Rabon, Jr., Evening the Odds in Civil Litigation: A Proposed Method-
ology for Using Adverse Inferences when Nonparty Witnesses Invoke the Fifth Amendment,
42 VAND. L. REv. 507, 514 (1989) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment prevents disclo-
sure far more effectively than protective orders).
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more likely to limit the scope of dissemination, rather than ban discovery
altogether. 16 5
The immigrant's interest in certainty is disserved not only by courts
that initially protect information about status and then order disclosure
but also by those that first require disclosure only to be reversed. This
"reveal, protect" chronology has occurred in cases involving sexual harass-
ment, unpaid wages, and medical malpractice, with immigrants receiving
"protection" on appeal many months or years after being ordered to dis-
close their status.166 In Flores v. Limehouse, for instance, immigrant plain-
tiffs alleged that their employer failed to pay wages and retaliated against
them by threatening deportation. The plaintiffs obeyed a court order and
admitted that they were unauthorized immigrants who submitted false
employment documents to the Social Security Administration. 16 7 After
forcing the plaintiffs to run this disclosure gauntlet, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs' immigration status was irrelevant to their claims. 168
Beyond failing to satisfy the immigrant's interests in speed, consis-
tency, and certainty, protective orders typically fail for lack of complete-
ness. Rule 26(c) grants courts wide discretion in determining the nature of
the protection afforded to plaintiffs. 169 Of the eight courses of action listed
in the Rule, only one mandates that "discovery not be had.' 170 Most of the
other options allow the discovering party to obtain the information sought
but limit the scope of the inquiry or the breadth of disclosure. The court
will often seek to strike a balance by limiting the number of questions or
the size of the audience privy to the answers. Under these scenarios, how-
ever, the plaintiff still must answer some status-based questions. 17 1 Thus,
even when motions for protective orders succeed, the end result often fails
to broadly prohibit questions related to status, both directly and indi-
165. See Smith et al., supra note 13, at 607 (arguing that courts will not issue protec-
tive orders if they deem status-based information relevant to remedies); Throne, supra
note 92, at 605.
166. See, e.g., EEOC v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D. Minn. 2006) (revers-
ing magistrate's order compelling plaintiff in sexual harassment case to admit or deny
her status as an unauthorized immigrant); Hernandez v. Paicius, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756,
757-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing trial court's order allowing disclosure of plain-
tiffs status in a medical malpractice action); Cabrera v. Ekema, 695 N.W.2d 78, 79-83
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing lower court's order requiring plaintiffs to reveal their
Social Security numbers).
167. Flores v. Limehouse, No. 04 Civ. 1294, 2006 WL 1328762, at *2 (D.S.C. May 11,
2006).
168. Id.
169. See Marcus, supra note 154, at 25 (describing the protective order's "inherent
flexibility").
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (authorizing courts to formulate orders as "justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue bur-
den or expense").
171. Courts have recognized that protective orders will not serve immigrants' privacy
needs unless they ban status-based discovery completely. See, e.g., Liu v. Donna Karan
Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that even with a confi-
dentiality agreement in place the dangers of inhibition and intimidation remain).
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rectly. t 7 2 Other courts, although refusing to consider a plaintiffs status
for liability purposes, allow juries to consider immigration status when cal-
culating damages for lost earnings.' 73 Still others require immigrants to
reveal their status to employers under a protective order that confines dis-
closure to the parties and the court. 17
4
Telling unauthorized immigrants that their employer cannot ask ques-
tions about their immigration status but can ask questions about where
they were born or what paperwork they used to obtain employment, recog-
nizes the intimidating potential of status-based inquiries but does not
diminish their effect. Likewise, limiting dissemination of status-based
information to the parties does not negate the chilling effect of the disclo-
sure or prevent the government or third-parties from accessing the informa-
tion.175 With their interests in anonymity, consistency, and completeness
rarely served by protective orders or other strategies pursued by advo-
cates, 176 immigrant plaintiffs currently lack an effective approach for
responding to post-Hoffman discovery.
172. For example, in EEOC v. First Wireless, a group of Hispanic employees alleged
that their employer engaged in racially discriminatory payment practices in violation of
Title VII. EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 4990, 2007 WL 586720, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007). After first issuing a protective order prohibiting discovery of
the plaintiffs' immigration status, EEOC v. First Wireless Group, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404,
406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), the magistrate eventually allowed discovery of the plaintiffs'
places of birth and employment application information. First Wireless Group, Inc.,
2007 WL 586720, at *3; see also EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (ordering immigrants to disclose their aliases, notwithstanding protective order).
173. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir.
2006); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (N.Y. 2006) (allowing the
"jury to consider immigration status as one factor in its determination of the damages, if
any, warranted under the Labor Law"); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802
N.Y.S.2d 56, 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
174. See, e.g., Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship, No. 06 Civ. 01043, 2007 WL
951781, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2007) ("[Tlhe privacy interests that Plaintiffs have in
the requested discovery can be protected and limited in use through a protective order.");
see also EEOC v. Kovacevich "5" Farms, No. 06 Civ. 0165, 2007 WL 1599772, at *4
(E.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (entering protective order for damages phase of trial allowing
disclosure of plaintiffs' Social Security numbers).
175. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 62 F.3d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing effects of allowing government access to testimony produced under civil protec-
tive order); Marcus, supra note 154, at 41-46 (discussing non-party access to protected
discovery materials).
176. In addition to obtaining protective orders, immigrants have sought to bifurcate
trials between liability and damages phases, as well as to limit the disclosure of status-
based information to in camera review. See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders,
supra note 13, at 2244; Martinez, supra note 8, at 691 (proposing bifurcation); Zucker,
supra note 108, at 617 (proposing in camera review). These strategies may effectively
delay the disclosure of status-based information, thus encouraging settlement prior to
an unauthorized immigrant's admission regarding his or her status. See Developments in
the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 13, at 2245. Bifurcation and in camera review,
however, both ensure that an immigrant will eventually disclose his or her immigration
status if the case proceeds to trial. Thus, the strategies fail to provide the immigrant
with complete protection throughout all phases of litigation. In addition, these
approaches supply employers with ever-increasing settlement leverage as the trial nears.
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B. Principles of the Privilege
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, "No per-
son . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."' 77 The Fifth Amendment's explicit restriction to "any criminal
case" would seem to preclude its application in the civil context. Neverthe-
less, courts have interpreted the term to refer to the type of punishment
that would flow from an inculpatory statement, rather than the specific
context of the procured testimony.' 78 The witness who testifies to wrong-
doing in a civil case increases the chance of criminal prosecution and can
therefore claim the privilege.
This interpretation has been challenged on both textual and historical
grounds. James Madison's proposed language to the Clause originally
stated, "[N]o person ... shall be compelled to be a witness against him-
self."'179 With the addition of "in any criminal case" to the final version of
the Fifth Amendment, some commentators have inferred an intent to limit
the privilege to criminal trials.' 8 0 Others, however, have argued that by
inserting "criminal case," the Framers sought merely to clarify that the
privilege applied to matters involving criminal, and not civil, liability. 18 1
The latter reading has carried the day,18 2 and it remains well-settled that
witnesses can claim the privilege in civil and criminal litigation, 18 3 as well
as in administrative and legislative proceedings.184
Unauthorized immigrants can claim the privilege to the same extent as
citizens. 185 Most unauthorized immigrants have committed at least one of
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
178. See Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1274 (noting that a witness in a civil case can
invoke the privilege if his or her testimony could aid a subsequent criminal
prosecution).
179. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 423 (2d ed. 1986).
180. See, e.g., Martin I. Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 121, 125
(1972) (summarizing the addition of "criminal case" to the Fifth Amendment and noting
that the phrase was added without recorded debate); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer,
Ripeness of Self-Incrimination Clause Disputes, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1323
(2005) (arguing that the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause has been widely misread
for over a century).
181. See Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment:
The Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a "Trial Right" in Chavez
v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1009-12 (2003) (distinguishing between the terms
"criminal case" and "criminal trial").
182. The result did not change in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). Although
the Supreme Court held that civil rights plaintiffs do not suffer Fifth Amendment depri-
vations until their testimony is used against them, the Court reaffirmed prior authority
allowing witnesses to assert the privilege in civil cases. Id. at 770-71.
183. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); see Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
184. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1998); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); McCarthy,
266 U.S. at 40 (1924); Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th
Cir. 2000); see also Kaminsky, supra note 180, at 122.
185. See Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging
unauthorized immigrant's self-incrimination privilege but finding no violation); Wall v.
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the following crimes: entering the country without inspection, providing
false immigration-related documents to obtain employment, or failing to
register with immigration officials.' 8 6 Because status-based questions
posed during civil discovery implicate these crimes, the immigrant has the
ability to assert the privilege and refuse to answer the questions.
Before evaluating the power of invocation, however, the principles and
policies underlying that power should be considered. A policy analysis
informs the many issues that immigrant invocation forces tribunals to
address. To what extent does the status-based question tend to incrimi-
nate? If a court draws an adverse inference from an immigrant's silence
does it exact too costly a price for invocation? Courts that are informed by
the privilege's underlying policies are more equipped to answer these and
other questions raised by an immigrant's silence.
Beginning with Jeremy Bentham, academics have long struggled to
ascertain the rationales underlying the privilege. 18 7 The Supreme Court
has said that the privilege "registers an important advance in the develop-
ment of our liberty- 'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make
himself civilized."' 188 Consistent with these broad pronouncements, advo-
cates have cited a long list of libertarian principles that they claim support
and underlie the privilege. Critics contend that this "market basket" 189
approach evinces the privilege's lack of governing principles, 190 especially
in the civil context. 19 1
Of the most commonly cited principles, three are viewed as fundamen-
tal justifications for the modern day privilege. 192 The privilege is said to
INS, 722 F.2d 1442, 1443 (9th Cir. 1984); Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir.
1978); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1978) (referring to unauthorized
immigrants' silence during deportation proceeding as "an appropriate exercise of their
Fifth Amendment privilege"); see also Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional
Confession Law- The International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken
by U.S. Investigators from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. LJ. 851, 881 n.172 (2003)
(discussing unauthorized immigrants' trial rights).
186. See infra Part IIL.C and accompanying discussion on immigration-related crimes.
187. See generally 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OFJUDICIAL EVIDENCE 207-83 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827).
188. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting ERWIN N. GRIS-
WOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
189. Friendly, supra note 138, at 686.
190. See Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1232 (arguing that rationales for the privilege rely
erroneously on moral philosophy rather than modern legal doctrine). For a thorough
critique of the privilege's traditional justifications, see Akhil Reed Amar & Rene B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REX'.
857, 889-98 (1995); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1986); Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last
Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65
BROOK. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (1999) (noting that the many justifications for the privilege
reinforce the notion that it has no governing policies).
191. See Heidt, supra note 16, at 1083-85 (arguing that the rationales apply with less
force in civil cases); see generally Friendly, supra note 138, at 672-98 (calling for a
retraction of the privilege).
192. David M. O'Brien, Fox Hunters, Old Woman, Hermits, and the Burger Court, 54
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 26, 27 (1978); Rabon, supra note 164, at 517 ("[T]hree rationales
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preserve individual privacy and fair prosecution while preventing cruelty.
Commentators have been particularly skeptical of the relevance of these
rationales in civil settings. Too often, however, civil extension critiques
rely on a civil-criminal distinction that becomes blurred when immigrants
face status-based questions in employment litigation. 193 Because of the
quasi-criminal nature of deportation and the immigrant's unique interests
in preserving private matters and preventing removal, the privilege's liber-
tarian rationales are particularly compelling in the context of immigrant-
initiated civil litigation.
1. Civil-Criminal Dichotomy
Removal proceedings, although considered civil in nature, 194 involve
quasi-criminal 195 sanctions that directly implicate the immigrant's liberty
interests. 196 The Supreme Court's characterization of removal hearings as
"civil" proceedings has been described as a legal fiction by scholars and
judges. 197 The Court has stated that although civil confinement serves the
goals of incapacitation and rehabilitation, criminal incarceration is a puni-
tive measure designed to achieve retributive and deterrent aims. 198 Upon
close examination, however, deportation more often serves the latter goals.
Once detained, deportees face a period of long-term confinement that
mirrors criminal punishment. 199 They are held in large, overcrowded dor-
mitories that resemble state penitentiaries. 20 0 Reports from detentions
centers indicate that some detainees are shackled, denied access to the out-
doors, and physically harmed through corporal punishment.2 0 1 Even after
largely explain the privilege as it exists today."); Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1232 (examin-
ing the three most common explanations for the privilege against self-incrimination).
193. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Crimi-
nal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1363 (1991) (referring to deportation as "a kind of banishment that
represents the ultimate separation from society").
194. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
195. See Nessel, supra note 119, at 374-75 (discussing the criminal aspects of
removal proceedings); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at
Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305, 333-34 (2000) (arguing that removal proceedings give rise to punitive
consequences).
196. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("Though deportation is not
technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and
deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That depor-
tation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be doubted.").
197. See Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1531 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin,J., concur-
ring) ("[Nlow is the time to wipe the slate clean and admit to the long evident reality that
deportation is punishment."); Nessel, supra note 119, at 373-74; Pauw, supra note 195,
at 305-06.
198. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-66 (1997).
199. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, JUSTICE DETAINED: CONDITIONS AT THE VARICK
STREET IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER 1-3 (1993); Barbara MacGrady, Note, Resort to
International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention
Centers, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 271, 280-82 (1997).
200. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 199, at 1-3.
201. See id.; see also MacGrady, supra note 199, at 280-82.
Cornell International Law Journal
the respondent is deemed removable through formal or informal proceed-
ings, a noncitizen may be detained for six months or longer before actually
being deported. 20 2 For the unauthorized immigrant, removal may result in
a far harsher punishment than incarceration. 20 3 Upon returning to her
country of origin-typically a place from which she spent a great deal of
time and effort to flee-the immigrant may face unemployment, extreme
poverty, inhumane living conditions, or war. 2 0 4
Although I leave a more detailed criticism of the civil-criminal distinc-
tion to others, 20 5 my point is to contextualize the consequences that unau-
thorized immigrants who invoke the privilege face. These outcomes
inform the policy debate. For example, the government's ability to prose-
cute and deport immigrants with evidence obtained by private employers
in civil litigation raises serious questions of autonomy and fairness.
Absent the privilege, this scenario is not entirely unlikely. In addition, the
unique threat of removal raises the price of truth for the unauthorized
immigrant, as compared to citizen witnesses. Thus, the privilege's ratio-
nales carry greater force for the unauthorized immigrant whose truthful
answer in the civil case implicates distinct collateral consequences.
2. Fairness
The fairness rationale argues that the criminal defendant must main-
tain a certain level of autonomy from the state in order to produce a fair
and just criminal prosecution. Bentham described this as "the fox hunter's
reason," stating that just as specific rules control the fox hunt, fair criminal
procedure requires the government to prosecute its case with evidence
derived independently from the defendant. 20 6 To do otherwise would
allow the prosecution to rely habitually on confessions as a primary form
of proof.20 7 Under the fairness rationale, the privilege forces the govern-
ment to prosecute crimes with evidence deemed to be more reliable than
compelled confessions. This outcome not only promotes balance between
the individual and the state, it also preserves the defendant's moral
202. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (authorizing detention beyond six
months if there is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future").
203. See Nessel, supra note 119, at 373 n.120 (arguing that deportation is "the harsh-
est punishment of all").
204. See Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True
Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 29, 59-60 (2003).
205. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 66 (1984); see also Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 105-06 (1998); Nessel supra note 119, at
373-76; Pauw, supra note 195, at 337-44; Pinzon, supra note 204, at 29-32.
206. BENTHAM, supra note 187, at 238-39; see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citing the "preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice" as a reason for the privilege); O'Brien, supra note 192,
at 36; Rabon, supra note 164, at 517-18 (discussing Bentham's critique).
207. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251, at
295-96 n.1 (John T. McNaugton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
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dignity.208
Critics charge that whatever merit the fairness rationale may have in
the criminal context, it has no place in civil cases. 20 9 After all, the problem
of governmental encroachment is not at play in civil proceedings between
private parties. 2 10 Far from browbeating a criminal defendant, the govern-
ment is not obtaining any evidence from the witness in civil cases. The
critique of the fairness rationale in civil cases, however, ignores the not-so-
attenuated link between civil discovery and subsequent criminal prosecu-
tions of immigrants. If immigrants were denied the privilege in civil litiga-
tion, the government could too easily sidestep fairness concerns by
prosecuting crimes with evidence discovered by private actors in immi-
grant-initiated civil litigation.2 1'
The fairness rationale carries particular weight in light of deportation
hearings. Currently, immigrants can claim the privilege in these civil pro-
ceedings. Although the immigration court can draw an adverse inference
from the respondent's silence, the situation would be far worse for the
immigrant were she forced to answer questions about alienage. 2 12 Presum-
ably these compelled admissions could be used as a basis not only for
removal but for criminal prosecution as well. These circumstances dimin-
ish the government's incentive to investigate and present outside evidence,
creating a process in which immigrants are questioned, detained, impris-
oned, and finally deported by their own admission. The privilege breaks
this chain of events, thereby encouraging a fairer prosecution. 2 13
3. Privacy
The privacy justification states simply that the privilege protects the
defendant's overriding privacy interest in keeping information related to
past criminal activity confidential. 21 4 Proponents of the privacy rationale
argue that the government should not be allowed to compel a witness to
reveal her most personal thoughts in order to gather incriminating testi-
208. See Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1234 (arguing that the immunity problem is "devas-
tating" to the privacy rationale).
209. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 180, at 127 (noting that "the government is in no
way involved" in civil cases between private parties).
210. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976) ("In areas where a
government cannot be said to be compelling such information, however, there is no such
circumvention of the constitutionally mandated policy of adversary criminal proceed-
ings."); Heidt, supra note 16, at 1084-85, 1111-12.
211. See Heidt, supra note 16, at 1084 n.92 (noting that the government might pres-
sure private parties to gather information in civil discovery); Dennis J. Bartlett, Note,
Adverse Inferences Based on Non-party Invocations: The Real Magic Trick in Fifth Amend-
ment Civil Cases, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 370, 374 (1985) (discussing the fairness
rationale).
212. See infra Parts III.C-D and accompanying discussion on the role of the Fifth
Amendment in removal proceedings.
213. See Green, supra note 190, at 634 (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAwYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY 194 (1988)) (noting that the privilege prevents criminal prosecutions
from morphing into an inquisitional system of justice).
214. See O'Brien, supra note 192, at 28 (summarizing the privacy rationale).
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mony. 2 15 Critics assert that the privacy rationale is inconsistent with the
realities of criminal prosecutions. Because the privilege protects only testi-
monial evidence, the government may still offer evidence gathered from
sources as personal as the defendant's body.2 16 If the state can prosecute
the defendant with her own blood and handwriting, why not elicit the
defendant's words as well?2 1 7 Even if the privilege is limited to the idea of
"mental privacy," 218 critics correctly note that the state can still compel
disclosure of those thoughts by granting the witness immunity from crimi-
nal prosecution.
2 19
Of the three putative rationales for the privilege, the privacy interest is
the weakest as applied to unauthorized immigrants. Just as with any crimi-
nal defendant, the unauthorized immigrant can be immunized from prose-
cution and forced to testify. If the privilege were really designed to protect
the immigrant's private thoughts, it would presumably prevent disclosure
under all circumstances. The privacy rationale, however, carries some-
what more weight when considering the actual mechanics of immigration
prosecutions. Immigrants rarely receive immunity from prosecution of
immigration-related crimes because the government seldom has an interest
in granting immunity.2 20 In nearly every circumstance involving possible
prosecution for illegal entry or document fraud, the government foregoes
prosecution altogether, initiating immediate removal proceedings instead.
Thus, although cogent, the critique of the privacy interests secured by the
privilege ignores the real-world prosecutions of immigration-related crimes,
which rarely involve immunity.
The physical intrusion privacy critique also seems inapposite to the
actual experience of immigrants in the criminal justice system. The evi-
dence used to prosecute immigrants most commonly involves the defen-
215. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, An Alternative to the Constitutional Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 31, 56-59 (1982); Robert S. Gerstein, The
Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L.
Rev. 343, 345-47 (1979); Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L.
REV. 216 (1961). But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 190, at 890-91 (arguing that wit-
nesses possess equally strong privacy interests in civil proceedings, thus undermining
the argument that privacy justifies the privilege in the criminal setting); Seidmann &
Stein, supra note 15, at 433 (summarizing and criticizing traditional justifications for
the right to silence as relying "on a conspicuously nonfactualist analysis").
216. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) ("[Tlhe prohibition
of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.").
217. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 222-24 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
218. Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reap-
praisal, 20 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 36 (1982).
219. See Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV.
193, 230 (1967); Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1234 (explaining the role of immunity in
privilege cases); see also O'Brien, supra note 192, at 48 (evaluating McKay's analysis of
the relationship between the privacy interest and the Fifth Amendment).
220. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and
Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 599-600 (1990)
(discussing the role of the privilege in removal hearings).
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dant's identity, outside witnesses, birth certificates, and other proof of
alienage. 221 The gathering of such evidence does not implicate privacy
concerns in the same way that intrusion of the defendant's body does in
other criminal settings. If the privilege is viewed as protecting only mental
privacy, 22 2 immigrants maintain a strong interest in preventing the forced
disclosure of their most personal thoughts regarding alienage. Absent the
privilege, courts could require unauthorized immigrants to reveal the
details of their immigration, document fraud, and aliases-embarrassing
subjects that often have little relation to the employment violations at issue.
4. Preventing Cruelty
Of the privilege's three main descriptive justifications, proponents
most often cite the goal of preventing "cruelty."223 The cruelty rationale 2 24
asserts that self-incrimination does harm to the human conscience by forc-
ing a person to choose between perjury, contempt, and self-incrimina-
tion.22 5 Thus, while the fairness rationale focuses on preserving a fair
system of criminal prosecution that yields convictions based on reliable,
non-self-confessional evidence, the cruelty rationale focuses on the privi-
lege's role in preserving human dignity and preventing the "unnatural act"
of self-condemnation. 226 Critics charge that there really is no cruelty in
forcing a witness to testify against herself. Although choosing between
self-incrimination and perjury may be unpleasant, the choice is no crueler
than other aspects of prosecution, such as the threat of incarceration or
forced testimony against friends or family members. 2 27 Further, the risks
of perjury and contempt sanctions are not unique to criminal defendants
but are hazards faced by all witnesses. 228 The rationale carries even less
force, critics charge, in civil cases in which the witness may face only a
remote chance of criminal prosecution. 22 9
For unauthorized immigrants, the risk of removal from the country is
far from hypothetical. In addition to direct criminal liability, unauthorized
immigrants face a severe collateral consequence not faced by citizens in
civil cases. The cruel choice theory applies with particular force to the
221. See id. at 602.
222. See Robert B. McKay, Book Review, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1960) (review-
ing LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959)).
223. Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1237 (describing the cruelty explanation as "[p]erhaps
the most common").
224. Many commentators refer to the cruelty rationale using Bentham's misogynistic
label, "the old woman's policy." BENTHAM, supra note 187, at 230; see O'Brien, supra
note 192, at 41-45.
225. O'Brien, supra note 192, at 27 (summarizing the principles and policies justify-
ing the privilege); see generally Dolinko, supra note 190, at 1090-107 (outlining the cru-
elty rationale).
226. John T. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional
Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY, &
POLICE SCI. 138, 147-48 (1960); O'Brien, supra note 192, at 43.
227. See BENTHAM, supra note 187, at 230-31; Heidt, supra note 16, at 1086; Rabon,
supra note 164, at 518; Stuntz, supra note 15, at 1238.
228. Bonventre, supra note 215, at 54-56; Green, supra note 190, at 631.
229. Heidt, supra note 16, at 1086-87.
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trilemma facing unauthorized immigrants who, absent the privilege, must
choose between perjury, contempt, and self-incrimination, knowing that
the latter option could lead to both prosecution and removal. Certainly
there is nothing cruel about the threats of perjury and contempt in forcing
witnesses to testify truthfully, but in deciding how to testify, the rational
witness weighs the moral and practical consequences of lying versus telling
the truth. The possibility of deportation alters the calculus in a way unique
to immigrants. In essence, the price of truth doubles. The collateral conse-
quence of removal incentivizes perjury and contempt-the remaining
options of the cruel choice. Thus, absent the privilege, immigrants would
feel a forceful pull away from truth-telling in a manner not felt by citizens.
The cruel choice theory argues that in order to blunt the force of these
collateral consequences courts should construe the privilege broadly for
immigrants who refuse to answer status-based questions.
C. Applying the Privilege to Immigrant-Initiated Civil Litigation
Assuming that the principles and policies of the Fifth Amendment
support extending the privilege to immigrants in civil litigation, what are
the practices of invocation? In order to claim the privilege, the question
posed must force the plaintiff immigrant to stand as a "witness against
himself." The information sought must be testimonial in nature and not
merely exhibitive. 230 The plaintiff can assert the privilege during discov-
ery 2 3 ' or as a witness at trial. 23 2 Civil litigants have claimed the privilege
in response to interrogatories, 233 requests for admission, 23 4 and
depositions. 235
The information sought must "tend to incriminate" the speaker,2 36 or,
as the common legal parlance puts it, the adverse answer would furnish a
230. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
231. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 656 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1970); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
232. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
233. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); Gordon v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
427 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970); De Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1178 (3rd Cir.
1970); Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968); United States v. Forty-
Seven Bottles, More or Less, Each Containing Thirty Capsules of Jenasol, 26 F.R.D. 4, 6
(D.NJ. 1960); Paul Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enter. Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333, 334
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
234. Gordon, 427 F.2d at 581.
235. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1086-89 (5th Cir. 1979); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Master Key
Litig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974); De Vita, 422 F.2d at 1178 (3rd Cir. 1970).
Although document production by itself is not considered "testimonial" and therefore
not covered by the privilege, if producing the documents authenticates them or concedes
the existence, control, or possession of the documents, then the plaintiff may claim the
privilege and refuse to produce them, assuming the other requirements of the privilege
are satisfied. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 608 (1984); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law:
Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1987) (discussing the Fisher
doctrine).
236. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-88 (1951); see also McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
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"link in the chain" required for criminal prosecution. 23 7 The "tend to
incriminate" standard represents a broadening of the privilege over earlier
verbal formulations that allowed witnesses to invoke only when their
responses constituted a direct admission of a crime or an element of a
crime. 2 38 Some courts require a "real" possibility of prosecution, 239 while
others state that a witness may invoke the privilege with a "remote" possi-
bility of prosecution.2 40 The "real" versus "remote" terminology is unfortu-
nate. Judges and commentators frequently misread this language as
requiring a determination of the likelihood of prosecution based on
prosecutorial resources and charging decisions. The "real possibility"
requirement, however, speaks to the incriminating nature of the response,
rather than an assessment of the chances of an actual government prosecu-
tion.2 4 1 "Real" possibility of prosecution thus refers to legal possibility.2 42
If the information sought might provide a clue of criminal wrongdoing to a
"hypothetical government investigator ' 243 and the criminal charge is still
legally viable, the witness can assert her Fifth Amendment privilege. If the
relevant criminal statute of limitations has passed or the witness has
received immunity, however, prosecution is legally impossible and the wit-
ness cannot claim the privilege. 2 44
In order for the response to provide a "link in the chain" of prosecu-
tion, the question put to the immigrant must implicate a particular
crime. 24 5 In nearly every employment case, a plaintiff can easily prove that
questions about her Social Security number or alienage implicate possible
crimes.24 6 Although unauthorized presence in the United States standing
alone is not a criminal offense, admitting this fact or other facts related to
alienage may prove elements of other crimes. 247 Entering the United States
237. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964);
Hashagen v. United States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960).
238. See Heidt, supra note 16, at 1093-94.
239. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) (requiring a "'substantial
and "real," and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazard[ I of incrimination"') (citations
omitted); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478
(1972); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 374-75 (1951); In re Master Key Litig., 507 F.2d at 293.
240. United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1384 (lth Cir. 1990); Wehling, 608
F.2d at 1087 n.5; United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.2 (1st Cir. 1973);
United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958).
241. In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (11th Cir. 1983).
242. See Marjorie S. White, Comment, Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 158, 160 n.19 (1981) (noting that the witness must establish
only the possibility of prosecution, rather than its likelihood).
243. Heidt, supra note 16, at 1065 (discussing the "great range of civil cases" in which
a witness can invoke the privilege).
244. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896); see also Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964).
245. Cheh, supra note 193, at 1385.
246. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1998); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Kanstroom, supra note 220, at 603 (discussing criminal
charges collateral to civil deportation proceedings).
247. Kanstroom, supra note 220, at 603-04 (noting that alienage and undocumented
residence, though not crimes, may implicate elements of crimes); Henry G. Watkins,
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without inspection and reentering the country following deportation are
crimes. 248 Any person who fraudulently presents documents such as a
Social Security card to satisfy employment-related immigration verification
requirements commits a felony.24 9 As discussed above, 25 0 immigrants
seeking to vindicate their employment rights face a barrage of questions
related to their immigration status in civil discovery. Defendants pose
questions about the immigrants' residency, paperwork, and prior aliases.
Because answers to such questions involve criminal offenses, the immi-
grant witness can claim the privilege. 25 1
The privilege is virtually self-policing because courts are nearly power-
less to overrule the invoker. 25 2 They must afford the privilege broad, lib-
eral construction 2 53 and can overrule an immigrant's decision to invoke
the privilege only if it is "perfectly clear" that the answer "cannot possibly
have such tendency to incriminate. ' 25 4 In the unusual situation in which a
court makes such a finding, the witness must respond or face contempt
charges.255 Given the deference that the "perfectly clear" standard affords
the invoker, employers will have great difficulty challenging the plaintiff
immigrant's ability to claim the privilege. 256 For this reason, the few
courts that have addressed the issue of immigrant invocation in civil cases
have found plaintiffs "entirely justified" in refusing to answer questions
about their status.25 7
D. Adverse Inferences: The Consequences of Silence
The Supreme Court has forcefully protected the criminal defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege. No adverse inference may be drawn from
Streamlining Deportation Proceedings: Self-Incrimination, Immunity from Prosecution, and
the Duty to Testify in a Deportation Context, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1075, 1081 (1985)
(discussing illegal entry and reentry as crimes).
248. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326 (2000); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path
of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 469, 499 (2007) (discussing immigration-related crimes).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2000) (false statements on employment verification form);
42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (2000) (fraudulent use of Social Security number).
250. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion on the proliferation of status-
based discovery following Hoffman.
251. Unauthorized immigrants who entered the country legally but overstayed their
visas may still face criminal punishment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006). They can be
charged with providing fraudulent employment documents or willfully failing to notify
the government of a change of address. Id.; see Kanstroom, supra note 220, at 603 n.19.
252. Heidt, supra note 16, at 1065-71.
253. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458 n.9 (8th Cir. 1963); Hashagen v.
United States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960).
254. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (quoting Temple v. Com-
monwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)).
255. See Kaminsky, supra note 180, at 122, 137 (noting that courts retain the power
to overrule a witness's invocation of the privilege, but the chances of a court actually
doing so are "remote").
256. Mannheimer, supra note 180, at 1299 (arguing that courts err on the side of
upholding claims of privilege).
257. See Pontes v. New England Power Co., No. 03-00160A, 2004 WL 2075458 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2004); Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005).
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silence, and the prosecutor is forbidden from commenting on the defen-
dant's invocation. 25 8 A strict prohibition against inferring guilt from
silence is necessary to prevent the Fifth Amendment from becoming a cruel
joke that guarantees silence in name but penalizes it in practice.2 5 9 Thus,
in Griffin v. California, the "high-water mark" 260 of Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence, the Supreme Court barred all penalties that make invocation
"costly."'2 6 1 Though Griffin was a criminal case, the Court initially applied
a similar rationale in civil cases, holding that the government may not
"exact[ I .. a price" from a civil witness who chooses to exercise this
"right[ ] of constitutional stature .... "262 Following these bold pronounce-
ments, the Supreme Court struck down several state and local laws that
attempted to penalize parties for remaining silent in civil actions. 2 63 The
line of cases extending strong protections to civil witnesses who invoke the
privilege took an abrupt turn in Baxter v. Palmigiano when the Burger
Court authorized courts to draw "adverse inferences against parties [who]
refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them
.... 264 Palmigiano was an inmate at a Rhode Island prison charged with
inciting a disturbance of prison operations. During the non-criminal hear-
ing before the prison disciplinary board, Palmigiano asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege and refused to discuss his role in the prison upris-
ing. After advising Palmigiano that his silence could be used against him,
the board ordered the prisoner placed in segregation for thirty days.
2 65
Reviewing Palmigiano's case, the Supreme Court found no constitutional
infirmity in the board's decision to penalize Palmigiano's silence. The
Court reasoned that the adverse inference was permissible because the
board did not impose the sanction automatically but only in conjunction
with other evidence incriminating Palmigiano. 2 66  Although Baxter
empowers courts to draw negative inferences from silence in civil cases,
several procedural requirements significantly reduce the likelihood that
courts will actually penalize immigrants for invoking the privilege.
258.. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614-15 (1965); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
259. See Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956) ("The
privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise
could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption
of perjury.").
260. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2018 (3d ed.
2007).
261. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15.
262. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
263. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973) (striking down New York statute
prohibiting the issuance of government contracts to persons who refuse to waive their
Fifth Amendment privilege); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (barring
discharge of city employees for refusal to waive privilege before grand jury); Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation of New York, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85
(1968) (same); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (forbidding the disbarment
of an attorney solely on the basis of the attorney's invocation of the privilege).
264. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
265. Id.,at 312-13.
266. Id. at 317-18.
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E. Limitations on Status-Based Inferences
Several factors counsel against drawing an adverse inference from an
immigrant's silence in civil litigation. First, the privilege law of the forum
jurisdiction may bar the inference altogether. Twenty-two states disallow
factfinders from drawing adverse inferences from the testimony of wit-
nesses who assert valid testimonial privileges. 26 7 For example, the Califor-
nia Evidence Code prohibits the trier of fact from drawing adverse
inferences "as to any matter at issue in the proceeding. '2 68 No negative
inference will attach to silent immigrant plaintiffs filing actions in these
state courts regardless of whether state or federal law governs their
claims. 269 In addition, the state privilege law will apply to state claims
filed in federal court.2 70
Second, even if drawn, the adverse inference alone cannot prove that
the silent plaintiff is in fact an unauthorized immigrant.2 7 1 A court that
penalizes an invoker based on her silence alone exacts too high a price on
her Fifth Amendment rights. 27 2 In the case of immigrant-initiated civil liti-
gation, a factfinder may not conclude that a plaintiff is an unauthorized
immigrant from the mere fact that she refuses to answer questions about
her status. This is because the inference is considered corroborative,
rather than independent evidence. 273 If the defendant has any hope of
convincing the court to grant a Hoffman-based defense, he must present
evidence beyond the plaintiffs silence and any consequent inference flow-
ing from it to prove unauthorized status. 2 74
Third, and most important, courts should be wary of attaching eviden-
tiary value to a plaintiff immigrant's silence because silence itself is ambig-
uous and noncommunicative. 275 Although silence is commonly perceived
as a tacit admission of guilt,27 6 witnesses who are factually innocent may
267. Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences Upon a Claim of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1355, 1394 (1995) (discussing states that prohibit
drawing adverse inferences from the assertion of testimonial privileges).
268. CAL. EVID. CODE § 913 (West 2006).
269. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and
Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1811-12 (1994).
270. Id. at 1812.
271. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) ("It is thus undisputed that an
inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to support an adverse decision by the
Disciplinary Board."); SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Lefkowitz and
Baxter require that there be evidence in addition to the adverse inference to support a
court's ruling.") (citing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977); Baxter,
425 U.S. at 318); see also Seidmann & Stein, supra note 15, at 487-88 (noting that civil
liability cannot arise from an adverse inference alone).
272. Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 808 n.5 (noting that a witness's silence is "only one of a
number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty").
273. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317-18; Seidmann & Stein, supra note 15, at 487-88.
274. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318.
275. Rabon, supra note 164, at 532 (discussing the relevance of silence and the preju-
dicial effect of inferring guilt from silence).
276. See, e.g.,John T. Noonan, Jr., Inferences from the Invocation of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 41 VA. L. REv. 311, 322-23 (1955) (arguing that a witness who
invokes the privilege would likely provide an incriminatory response if she answered the
question).
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claim the privilege as well as the guilty. 27 7 Courts that allow jurors to infer
guilt from a plaintiff immigrant's silence assume that faced with an accusa-
tory question, an innocent witness would deny the charges. 2 78 The theory
is defective on several fronts. Innocent witnesses may fear an erroneous
criminal prosecution and thus choose to remain silent even though they
have nothing to hide. In addition, the question posed may not be accusa-
tory, thereby amplifying the ambiguity of silence. For example, during a
deposition the defendant may ask, "Where did you reside five years ago?"
or "What documents did you provide to your employer to obtain employ-
ment?" There are no obvious inferences to draw from a witness's refusal to
answer these questions. The jury is left to speculate as to how a witness
might incriminate herself by responding to such apparently innocuous
questions.2 79 The deponent's silence is evidentially suspect because of the
innumerable possible answers to such questions, none of which becomes
any more probable from the non-answer.
Consider a far more pointed line of questioning in which defense
counsel asks, "You are an illegal alien from Mexico, aren't you?" A juror
allowed to draw an adverse inference in this case would certainly conclude
that the plaintiff is an unauthorized immigrant. Because the innocent can
claim the privilege as well as the guilty, however, the deponent's truthful
response might be: "Absolutely not, I was born in the United States and am
an American citizen." Thus, by inferring guilt from silence, the factfinder
erroneously gives evidentiary weight to the question posed.
280
Assuming, however, the court finds that the immigrant's silence is
competent evidence of unauthorized status, the inference is still inadmissi-
ble if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice to the plaintiff immigrant. 28 1 The inference implicates at least
two separate prejudices, one related to those who invoke the privilege and
another related to unauthorized immigrants. The first prejudice derives
from the lay misconception that only the guilty "plead the Fifth. '28 2 The
277. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) ("IT]ruthful responses of an innocent
witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminat-
ing evidence from the speaker's own mouth."); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957) ("[O]ne of the basic functions of the privilege is to protect innocent men."); see
also Seidmann & Stein, supra note 15, at 433 (arguing that the privilege enhances the
credibility of innocent suspects by creating an anti-pooling effect that distinguishes the
guilty from the innocent).
278. See Heidt, supra note 16, at 1116 (discussing the common belief that "the natural
reaction of an innocent man to an untrue accusation is a prompt denial").
279. John C. O'Brien, Judicial Responses When A Civil Litigant Exercises a Privilege:
Seeking the Least Costly Remedy, 31 ST. Louis U. LJ. 323, 334 (1987) (questioning the
probative value of silence).
280. See, e.g., Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 715-17 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Winter, J., dissenting) (discussing the dangers of drawing adverse inferences from a
witness's refusal to answer leading questions).
281. Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1266 (9th Cir. 2000); see
also FED. R. EVID. 403; Rabon, supra note 164, at 549-50 (stating that the Rule 403
methodology controls the entire adverse inference analysis).
282. See Heidt, supra note 16, at 1123-24 (arguing that jurors view a silent witness
"as a criminal who has probably eluded justice").
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second prejudice derives from the American public's hostility toward illegal
immigration.28 3 Given the current antipathy toward unauthorized immi-
grants, some jurors are quite likely to reject legal claims brought by plain-
tiffs who they view as "lawbreakers."
Prior to balancing prejudice and relevance, the court must determine
whether the inference (i.e. the assumption that the plaintiff is an unautho-
rized immigrant) has any probative value.28 4 Thus, even if the court deter-
mines that the witness's silence is competent evidence of status, and even if
this fact is not unduly prejudicial, the court still should not draw the infer-
ence unless the issue of immigration status limits the rights and remedies
available to the plaintiff. The application of the inference depends on the
threshold question of whether Hoffman in fact places unauthorized immi-
grants in a separate remedial universe, as claimed by some employers. If
the law is as it was prior to Hoffman and unauthorized immigrants still
enjoy the same employment rights and remedies as their status-holding
coworkers, 2 85 the inference is irrelevant. In order to answer this threshold
question, the court should consider the relevance of status to each employ-
ment claim at issue.
1. Wage and Hour Law
An immigrant's silence in wage cases should not trigger an adverse
inference because by barring unauthorized immigrants from recovering
unpaid minimum wages, lower courts would undermine the very immigra-
tion policies that the Supreme Court sought to bolster in Hoffman.28 6 In
order to discourage employers from exploiting immigrants' willingness to
work for sub-minimum wages, unauthorized immigrants must be empow-
ered to recover unpaid wages like all other employees.28 7 Otherwise, unau-
283. See, e.g., DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE
OF CITIZENSHIP 42-72 (1996) (discussing American attitudes toward illegal immigration
and the recasting of nationality); David W. Haines & Karen E. Rosenblum, Preface to
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1, 4-7 (David W. Haines &
Karen E. Rosenblum eds., 1999) (discussing the social and political aspects of illegal
immigration); Legomsky, supra note 248, at 499-500 (discussing the public perception
of immigrants as criminals).
284. FED. R. EVID. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
285. See Reynolds, supra note 81, at 1269 (noting that prior to Hoffman, unauthorized
immigrants enjoyed "protection without regard to immigration status"); Wishnie, supra
note 91, at 502 (summarizing federal courts' near-universal conclusion prior to Hoffman
that unauthorized immigrants were covered by federal employment protections). But see
Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186-88 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that
unauthorized immigrants are not "qualified" for employment and therefore not covered
by Title VII).
286. Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("If the FLSA did not
cover undocumented aliens, employers would have an incentive to hire them .... By
reducing the incentive to hire such workers the FLSA's coverage of undocumented aliens
helps discourage illegal immigration and is thus fully consistent with the objectives of
the IRCA.") (citing Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988)).
287. See Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("Allowing
employers to hire undocumented workers and pay them less than the wage mandated by
statute is a strong incentive for the employers to do so, which in turn encourages illegal
immigration.").
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thorized immigrants will become an even more exploitable workforce, thus
encouraging employers to knowingly hire this group of workers in violation
of the IRCA.
Hoffman is irrelevant to wage claims because of the past work/lost
work distinction. 28 8 Unlike Jose Castro in Hoffman, who sought backpay
for the time that he was unemployed because of his employer's illegal con-
duct, plaintiffs attempting to recover the minimum wage under the FLSA
simply seek payment for hours previously worked. 28 9 Because FLSA
claims involve past work, rather than lost work, the mitigation concern
expressed in Hoffman is irrelevant. 290
A court faced with an immigrant refusing to answer status-based ques-
tions in a FLSA action can draw an adverse inference only if the right to
recover unpaid wages is now restricted to work-authorized employees.
Because such a finding would constitute a flawed interpretation of federal
immigration policy and Hoffman, the negative inference is irrelevant to the
underlying wage claim.
2. Anti-discrimination Law
A plaintiffs refusal to discuss her status in Title VII litigation is irrele-
vant unless Hoffman's discussion of labor law remedies can somehow be
read as a signal to limit backpay under other federal employment statutes.
The courts rejecting Hoffman's extension to anti-discrimination laws have
noted several distinctions between Title VII and the NLRA. 29 ' For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court stated in Hoffman that the NLRB lacks authority to
balance competing federal objectives; in contrast, federal courts possess
the power and expertise to evaluate Title VII in light of the IRCA. 292
In addition to the difference in interpretive bodies, Title VII and the
NLRA have very different remedial schemes. The Supreme Court has
referred to Title VII as a national "policy of the highest priority," which
depends on enforcement by private attorneys general. 293 The plaintiff
288. See supra Part l.A.1 and accompanying discussion on decisions declining to
extend Hoffman to FLSA claims.
289. Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501 (W.D. Mich. 2005)
(citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002)) (noting
that the Supreme Court focused on the fact that "Castro was not entitled to receive
backpay for work he never performed").
290. After Hoffman, the Department of Labor reaffirmed the right of unauthorized
immigrants to recover wages under the FLSA. See Application of U.S. Labor Laws to
Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage and
Hour Division, supra note 79.
291. For a comprehensive argument against extending Hoffman to Title VII, see Ho &
Chang, supra note 65, at 503-17.
292. See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 237 (2d Cir. 2006)
("In Hoffman Plastic, the Supreme Court sought to reconcile two federal statutes to
ensure that one did not trench on the other, a task routinely performed by federal
courts."); see also Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 (2002) (noting that the NLRB "has no
authority to enforce or administer" the IRCA); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057,
1068 (9th Cir. 2004) ("A district court has the very authority to interpret both Title VII
and IRCA that the NLRB lacks.").
293. N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980).
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enforces not only her own rights but also "the important congressional
policy against discriminatory employment practices."' 294 The importance
of this policy is reflected in the wide range of remedies available to victims
of discrimination, in comparison to the NLRA, which provides backpay
and reinstatement as the only meaningful remedies for wrongfully dis-
charged employees. 295 The Ninth Circuit has recognized the distinction
between the NLRA and Title VII, noting that eliminating backpay under the
NLRA still preserves the Act's "traditional remedies" but doing so under
federal anti-discrimination laws seriously weakens Title ViI's private
enforcement scheme. 29 6
Put simply, Hoffinan involved the Supreme Court's balancing of two
unique federal statutes, the IRCA and the NLRA;2 9 7 the decision did not
address Title VII. Because denying backpay to unauthorized workers in
Title VII cases would severely undermine federal anti-discrimination poli-
cies, courts should refrain from drawing adverse inferences from an immi-
grant's silence in these cases.
3. State Law, Preemption, and Adverse Inferences
With stated deference to the federal immigration concerns expressed
in Hoffman, certain courts have struck down tort and workers' compensa-
tion claims brought by unauthorized immigrants. Although most judges
considering these state claims have rejected preemption arguments, 298
some courts have cited Hoffman as either persuasive authority2 99 or as a
binding indication of the IRCA's preemptive force. 30 0
294. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
295. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1067 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975)); see also De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 239 (C.D. Ill.
2002) (arguing that eliminating backpay under Title VII would "frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination .. .and making persons whole").
296. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1067.
297. Developments in the Law-jobs and Borders, supra note 13, at 2229 ("Hoffman
could-and should-be understood as a narrow decision balancing two federal statutes
... . .).
298. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2006);
see Flores v. Limehouse, No. 04 Civ. 1294, 2006 WL 1328762, at * 2 (D.S.C. May 11,
2006) (arguing that the IRCA does not preempt unauthorized immigrants' wage claims);
Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 77-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Safeharbor
Employer Servs. I, Inc. v. Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
("IRCA does not... so thoroughly occupy the field as to require a reasonable inference
that Congress left no room for states to act."); Cont'l Pet Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 604
S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep't. of Labor, 154 P.3d
1080, 1084 (Kan. 2007); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-60 (N.Y.
2006).
299. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 519-20 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003) (finding Hoffman "highly instructive" and noting that "the highest court in the
land speaks with authority when it comes to determining what is a federal crime").
300. See, e.g., Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336 (M.D.
Fla. 2003) (striking down unauthorized immigrant's common law claims for lost wages
because to do otherwise would "trench[ ] upon the immigration policy of the United
States"); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01 Civ. 1241, 2003 WL 22519678, at *6
(D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003) (relying on the IRCA to strike down unauthorized immigrant's
tort claim for lost future earnings).
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Although a full analysis of federal preemption and the IRCA is beyond
the scope of this article, a brief discussion is necessary in order to under-
stand why Hoffman does not limit a state's power to extend workplace pro-
tections to unauthorized immigrants. For a state court faced with the
decision of whether to penalize a plaintiff who invokes the privilege, the
IRCA's lack of preemptive force counsels against drawing adverse
inferences. 30 1
Hoffman does not raise federalism issues; the Supreme Court
addressed only a potential conflict between two federal statutes.30 2 Thus,
any state court decision based on IRCA preemption explores a subject that
the Supreme Court never addressed in Hoffman. As with any preemption
analysis, the inquiry begins with determining congressional intent. 30 3 Was
the IRCA intended to bar states from awarding backpay to unauthorized
immigrants injured on the job, killed in automobile accidents, or victim-
ized by other types of tortious conduct? In areas where the state possesses
broad regulatory authority, such as occupational safety and workplace
rights,30 4 courts are extremely hesitant to give a federal act preemptive
force absent a "clear and manifest" expression by Congress to do so. 30 5
It would be an incredible stretch to argue that the IRCA expressly
preempts the state's ability to award lost earnings to unauthorized immi-
grants.30 6 The IRCA contains only one express preemption clause, which
prohibits states from "imposing civil or criminal sanctions" on employers
who hire unauthorized immigrants. 30 7 A personal injury award is not a
state-imposed "sanction. '30 8 The conduct governed by tort and workers'
compensation claims does not involve "employ[ing], or recruit[ing] . . .
unauthorized aliens"'30 9 but involves workplace injuries or breaches of
duties owed to plaintiffs. If anything, the fact that the IRCA contains a
clause explicitly preempting certain state conduct while omitting any refer-
301. See generally Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 13, at 2242
("The most important doctrinal issue in question is whether the IRCA will be interpreted
to preempt state protections for illegal workers .... ").
302. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 237-38.
303. Retail Clerks Int'l Assoc. v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
304. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) ("States possess broad authority
under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers
within the State."); see also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (requir-
ing that Congress express a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt areas of state
police powers).
305. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
306. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002) (noting that the
best evidence of congressional preemptive intent is the language of the statute).
307. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000).
308. See Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1256 (2006) ("The legislative
history of IRCA confirms this interpretation, as the preemption language in section
1324a(h)(2) was intended to apply only to civil fines and criminal sanctions imposed by
state or local law.").
309. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).
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ence to tort claims implies an absence of preemptive intent.3 10
Field preemption analysis produces the same result. 3 11 Although
Congress enacted the IRCA pursuant to its exclusive power to regulate
immigration and naturalization, 3 12 the congressional record lacks any ref-
erence to an attempt to affect state tort and employment laws.31 3 In fact,
the IRCA's legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend "to
undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law."3 1
4
Even absent express and field preemption, a state judge could still
draw an adverse inference if she determines that the plaintiffs unautho-
rized immigration status is relevant to a conflict preemption analysis.3 15
The court must determine whether a defendant ordered to pay lost wages
to an unauthorized immigrant is physically unable to comply with both the
state court judgment and the IRCA or whether compliance with the judg-
ment poses a "direct and positive obstacle" to the "accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."3 16 The "physi-
cal inability" analysis is easily dismissed. Awarding an unauthorized immi-
grant lost wages does not require an employer to violate the IRCA by
"hir[ing] ... an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien."'3 17 Com-
pared to a reinstatement order, which would require an employer to know-
ingly employ an unauthorized immigrant, a backpay award does not violate
the IRCA because it does not foist an unlawful employment relationship on
the employer.
Although the "physical inability" argument is unlikely to yield fruit, an
employer may argue that awarding lost earnings to an unauthorized immi-
grant constitutes a direct and positive obstacle to the accomplishment of
the IRCA's objectives. Any potential conflict between a backpay award and
the IRCA's policies, however, is not "direct and positive" but rather circui-
tous and hypothetical. In fact, a state's decision to eliminate the ability of
unauthorized immigrants to recover lost earnings is far more likely to cre-
ate a direct conflict with the IRCA's objectives. In essence, a state that
restricts tort recovery to citizens encourages employers to "first hire, then
310. See Wishnie, supra note 91, at 513 (arguing that the IRCA's express preemption
of certain state acts strongly implies a lack of intent to preempt state employment laws
and torts).
311. See id.
312. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977).
313. Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1256 ("[Nlothing in [the IRCA] indicat[es] that Con-
gress meant to affect state regulation of occupational health and safety, or the types of
damages that may be recovered in a civil action arising from those laws.").
314. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 8-9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757,
5757-58 (emphasis added).
315. See Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 62 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (rejecting arguments related to express and field preemption and defining the
"principal question" as "whether an award of lost wages to an undocumented alien
presents an obstacle to the [clongressional objectives underlying the IRCA").
316. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Kelly v. Washington, 302
U.S. 1, 10 (1937).
317. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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abuse, and finally retaliate" against unauthorized immigrants. 3 18 Such a
result would frustrate Congress's primary purpose in enacting the IRCA:
decreasing employers' incentives to hire unauthorized immigrants. 31 9 Like-
wise, the denial of certain state remedies would act as an additional pen-
alty on unauthorized immigrants for their IRCA-related violations thus
disrupting the careful immigration enforcement scheme that Congress
crafted.3 20
The adverse inference conceivably could affect a state court's ability to
award damages to an unauthorized immigrant only if the court finds a
clear and manifest congressional intent to prevent states from awarding
lost earnings to this class of workers. A close reading of the text and poli-
cies of the IRCA, however, leads to the opposite conclusion, thus making
any status-based inference irrelevant to tort and workers' compensation
claims.
F. Swords, Shields, and Status: Dismissing the Silent Plaintiffs Claims
Beyond the risk of adverse inferences, silent immigrant plaintiffs con-
front the far greater penalty of dismissal should they refuse to answer sta-
tus-based questions. Nearly all of the academic commentary on the use of
the privilege in civil litigation characterizes the invoker as a defendant. 32 1
Courts are reluctant to penalize civil defendants who are viewed as invol-
untary participants in the civil action. On the other hand, there is an intui-
tive sense of injustice in allowing plaintiffs to file suit and then refuse to
answer questions about their claims. 3 22 The perception is that the plaintiff
who sues and then remains silent uses the Fifth Amendment as a shield to
protect against incrimination and a sword to gain an upperhand in
318. NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing that an expansion of
Hoffman would create a perverse incentive for employers to recruit unauthorized immi-
grants and violate workplace protections); see also Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 66 ("[O]ur
own analysis of the preemption issue leaves us firmly convinced that requiring defend-
ants to pay the same damages to all plaintiffs regardless of their immigration status not
only does not interfere with, but actually advances, the immigration policy of the United
States ....").
319. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (l1th Cir. 1988) ("Congress enacted
the IRCA to reduce illegal immigration by eliminating employers' economic incentive to
hire undocumented aliens."); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 78 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) ("Allowing employers to hire undocumented workers and pay them less than
the wage mandated by statute is a strong incentive for the employers to do so, which in
turn encourages illegal immigration."); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246,
1257 (N.Y. 2006).
320. Majlinger, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (citing Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F.
Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. 111. 1936)) (rejecting conflict preemption and noting that a state's
attempt to withhold certain remedies "impos[es] upon undocumented aliens an addi-
tional penalty not authorized by federal law").
321. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 16, at 1081 (referring to the privilege as a potent
"weapon in the hands of civil defendants"); Kaminsky, supra note 180, at 121 (same);
Rabon, supra note 164, at 526.
322. See, e.g., Kaminsky, supra note 180, at 143 (arguing that it would be "exceed-
ingly unfair" to allow a plaintiff who actively seeks the court's aid to obstruct discovery
by "keeping essential aspects of his case secret").
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discovery.3 23
The "sword and shield" doctrine authorizes courts to dismiss silent
plaintiffs' claims, while allowing defendants to invoke the privilege without
consequence. In reality, however, the doctrine fosters a false distinction
among those who assert constitutional privileges. When an unauthorized
immigrant files a civil action related to alleged workplace violations, her act
is "voluntary" only in the sense that she seeks relief from the only tribunal
that can vindicate her employment rights.3 24 The semantics of the debate
could easily be reordered to state that by failing to pay employees their
wages or by engaging in sexual harassment, the employer has "voluntarily"
committed workplace violations. 3 25 Because unauthorized immigrants are
often the involuntary victims of such unlawful employment practices, the
sword and shield doctrine "has not carried the day," and modern courts
are unlikely to dismiss an action solely because the invoker happens to be
the plaintiff.3
2 6
Dismissal is proper only when "other, less drastic, remedies are not
available."3 27 Courts have imposed the ultimate sanction of dismissal3 28
when plaintiffs have refused to provide any discovery 3 29 or refused to
answer questions central to the issue of liability.3 30 If the questions that
the plaintiff refuses to answer involve secondary matters, dismissal is inap-
propriate. For example, in Campbell v. Gerrans, a husband and wife
alleged that San Francisco police officers had violated their civil rights dur-
ing a search of their home. The plaintiffs answered thirty of thirty-four
interrogatories but asserted their privilege against self-incrimination in
response to four interrogatories related to the couple's alleged drug traf-
ficking.3 3 ' Following the trial court's dismissal of the action based on the
couple's silence, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the interrogatories
"were of a highly questionable nature" and that dismissal under these facts
323. See, e.g., Penn Comm. Specialties, Inc. v. Hess, 65 F.R.D. 510, 512 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (comparing parties "involuntarily thrust into such quandary" to situations in
which "the invoking party is voluntarily the moving party affirmatively seeking equity");
Indep. Prod. Corp v. Loew's, Inc, 22 F.R.D. 266, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (describing the
"uneven justice" of allowing plaintiffs to invoke the privilege).
324. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979).
325. See White, supra note 242, at 163 (criticizing the description of plaintiffs as vol-
untary litigants).
326. McMullen v. Bay Ship Mgmt., 335 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2003); see also White,
supra note 242, at 173 (summarizing the modern trend of rejecting automatic dismissal
as a penalty for invocation).
327. Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982); see also McMullen, 335 F.3d at 218.
328. See Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1089 (describing dismissal as a "drastic remedy").
329. See, e.g., Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969) (dismissing complaint
due to plaintiffs refusal to provide any discovery).
330. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 346 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (D. Minn. 1972) (refusal to
answer questions directly related to defendant's liability); see also Serafino v. Hasbro,
Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518-19 (1st Cir. 1996); Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, 901 F.2d
944 (11th Cir. 1990); Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 615 F.2d
595, 599 (3d Cir. 1980); Hudson Tire Mart, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 518 F.2d 671,
674 (2d Cir. 1975).
331. Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1979).
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made the plaintiffs assertion of the privilege too costly.3 3 2 Contrast Camp-
bell with Lyons v. Johnson, in which a plaintiff in another civil rights action
refused to sit for a deposition or provide any discovery related to her
claims.3 33 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff's "unyielding refusal" to
answer questions justified dismissal due to the prejudice that her silence
caused the defendants. 3 34
In the case of unauthorized immigrants who refuse to answer status-
based questions, courts have at least three options, all of which are less
burdensome than dismissal. Accordingly, silent plaintiff immigrants
should not be penalized with dismissal-a "sanction of last resort"3 35 -
given that several "viable alternative[s] exist .... ,,336 In response to a
plaintiff who refuses to answer questions about her status, the court could
determine that Hoffman does not control the employment claim at issue, in
which case the plaintiffs invocation would not prejudice the employer.
Even if the court determines that the plaintiffs silence directly implicates a
valid Hoffman-based defense, the court can draw an adverse inference from
the plaintiff's silence or strike the plaintiff's claim for backpay. 33 7 Even
under the broadest reading, Hoffman affects only those claims involving
lost earnings; the decision does not limit an employer's liability or a plain-
tiff's ability to recover other remedies. In light of the options available to
the court, dismissal would constitute an erroneously imposed, "costly"3 38
penalty on the plaintiff who asserts the privilege.
G. Fear and Removal: The Risks of Invocation
To this point, I have argued that the Fifth Amendment serves the unau-
thorized immigrant's litigation interests, both as a matter of policy and
practice. The promising scenario pictured here is not without secondary
effects. Immigrants may fear that silence, or an adverse inference drawn
from silence, will increase their risk of removal. Extensive litigation over
invocations and inferences could undercut the privilege's claimed effi-
ciency and protective benefits.
The model here should be evaluated in the context of its alternatives.
Other possible methods for responding to status-based questions include:
332. Id. at 1057-58.
333. Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969).
334. Id. at 541-42.
335. Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1976).
336. Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996); see also McMullen v.
Bay Ship Mgmt., 335 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc.,
25 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1994)) ("[T]he detriment to the party asserting [the privilege]
should be no more than is necessary to prevent unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the
other side."); Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1979).
337. See, e.g., Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 464, 465-66 (D. Md.
1989) (refusing to dismiss plaintiffs action but striking plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages); Bootz v. Childs, 627 F. Supp. 94, 102 (N.D. III. 1985) (rejecting dismissal in
favor of adverse inference).
338. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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convincing the defendant to refrain from posing such questions,3 39 admit-
ting unauthorized status, obtaining a protective order, and refraining from
filing suit. Although pre-discovery conciliation is certainly desirable, the
intimidation gained from status-based questioning represents an irresisti-
ble discovery tactic for many employers. By forcing the court to make a
determination on Hoffman's relevance, the admission route carries the
same elucidative benefits as the privilege. Moreover, an immigrant's deci-
sion to admit unauthorized status would eliminate most of the motion
practice that either a protective order or invocation might trigger. These
benefits notwithstanding, admission is not a viable option for most unau-
thorized immigrants who would absorb the full brunt of the questions'
intimidating force by disclosing their status in open court. Further, unlike
invocation, an admission constitutes direct evidence of criminal liability
and deportability that theoretically could be used against the immigrant in
subsequent proceedings. Finally, although the immigrant's decision to
simply stay out of court would "solve" the problems posed by status-based
questions, the result would weaken the already fragile system of employ-
ment protections for immigrants and harm statutory rights designed to
benefit all workers.
1. Intimidation
The privilege does not fully eliminate the intimidating effect of the
employer's status-based questioning. Unlike a criminal defendant who can
refuse to take the witness stand altogether, the civil litigant must ordinarily
face her adversary and assert the privilege in response to each incriminat-
ing question at trial.340 In fact, even if the parties are aware that the wit-
ness will assert the privilege, defense counsel can request that the plaintiff
take the stand and claim the privilege in front of the jury.3 4 1 The same
rule applies during discovery: The plaintiff must wait for an incriminating
interrogatory, request for production, or deposition question before claim-
ing the privilege. 342
The immigrant's lawyer can counter some of the intimidation by pre-
paring the witness and instructing her on the meaning and purpose of the
privilege. The question is asked, the privilege is asserted, and the parties
move to the substance of the case. Compare this rather efficient scenario
to the process of obtaining a protective order, which frequently halts dis-
covery and requires briefs and hearings. The delay undermines the immi-
grant's confidence in the process and her lawyer. After all, the lawyer
cannot guarantee how the court will rule after weeks or months of argu-
339. See, e.g., SMITH ET AL., supra note 45, at 17-18 (recommending informal resolu-
tion of disputes over status-based discovery).
340. Anglada v. Sprague, 822 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976).
341. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509, 522 (8th Cir. 1984);
Brinks, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708-10 (2d Cir. 1983).
342. N. River Ins. Co. v. Stefano, 831 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1987); Hudson Tire
Mart v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 518 F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that the depo-
nent may claim the privilege "[o]nly after the incriminating question is asked").
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ment on the motion. In the meantime, the immigrant waits and wonders
whether she will have to reveal her secret to the defendant and the court.
In contrast, a lawyer who instructs her client to assert the privilege can
almost unreservedly assure the client that she will be protected from forced
disclosure throughout the litigation. Finally, the court maintains the dis-
cretion to allow plaintiffs counsel to assert the privilege on the client's
behalf.3 4 3 If permitted, this tactic further diminishes the intimidating
effect of the questions.
2. Efficiency
Another possible objection to the privilege involves the immigrant's
interests in speedy resolution of claims. 34 4 Invocation triggers two litiga-
ble issues: (1) whether the question at issue tends to incriminate and (2)
whether the court's adverse inference constitutes an automatic penalty that
makes invocation too costly. 34 5 If fully litigated, these issues would elimi-
nate the likelihood of an efficient resolution of the dispute-a goal held by
immigrants and promoted by federal discovery rules. The first issue will
rarely give rise to extensive debate. Questions about Social Security num-
bers or alienage implicate the witness in document fraud and illegal entry
and thus tend to incriminate. Even if the employer were to challenge the
immigrant's ability to claim the privilege, the court would allow invocation
unless it were "perfectly clear" that that the answer "cannot possibly have
such tendency to incriminate.
3 46
The issue of adverse inferences could involve extensive briefing and
argument, but only if the plaintiff immigrant chooses to contest the infer-
ence. Plaintiff's counsel may opt to record a brief objection in order to
preserve the issue for appeal, without stopping litigation. Any delay
beyond this would be a tactical decision strictly controlled by the plaintiffs
specific litigation interests.
3. Flagging Issues
Immigrants may believe that invocation heightens the risk of removal.
As a natural consequence of their uncertain presence in the United States,
unauthorized immigrants fear deportation more than workplace exploita-
tion or criminal prosecution. 34 7 Any proposal that fails to account for the
coercive nature of implied deportation will be useless to most unautho-
343. United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 649 (6th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff's counsel
can always attempt to assert the privilege on her client's behalf. Bigby v. United States,
21 F.3d 1059, 1062 (11th Cir. 1994). Absent a timely objection from the defendant, the
invocation will be deemed effective. Id.
344. See supra Part III.A and accompanying discussion on protective orders and immi-
grants' litigation interests.
345. See Marc Youngelson, The Use of 26(c) Protective Orders: "Pleading the Fifth" With-
out Suffering "Adverse" Consequences, 1994 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 245, 265 (1994) (noting
that debates over inferences can slow litigation).
346. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (quoting Temple v. Com-
monwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)).
347. See Smith et al., supra note 13, at 607.
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rized immigrants. Regarding removal, the privilege raises what I call flag-
ging and transfer problems. The immigrant's refusal to discuss her status
brands her as suspect in the eyes of the court and opposing counsel. Sim-
ply by declining to answer status-based questions, the immigrant flags her-
self as unauthorized. Rationally or not, she may fear that this flagging
effect will draw the attention of immigration officials or cause her
employer to report her to the government.
The flagging problem is to some extent an unavoidable consequence
of immigrant-initiated civil litigation. Whether the immigrant seeks a pro-
tective order or asserts the privilege, nothing can fully prevent an employer
from alerting immigration officials to the immigrant's actions.348 If suffi-
ciently motivated, extremely defiant parties will release information from
the proceedings in violation of a court order. 34 9 Invocation will create a far
smaller flagging effect than the alternative strategy of obtaining a protective
order. This result is largely a function of the time and effort associated
with invocation, as compared to the protective order. Because the unautho-
rized immigrant will expend considerably more time obtaining the protec-
tive order than claiming the privilege, she increases the risk of drawing
attention to her unwillingness to discuss her status under the former
approach.
Even assuming that invocation creates some flagging effect, it seems
unlikely, though not impossible, that immigration officials would interpret
a report of a plaintiff who refuses to answer status-based questions as the
kind of reliable information warranting an investigation of a suspected
unauthorized immigrant. Nonetheless, assuming that the government
decided to investigate a plaintiff who claims the privilege in civil proceed-
ings, any subsequent removal action would violate the Department of
Homeland Security's internal guidelines that caution against the agency's
involvement in labor disputes.3 50 Although these guidelines are largely dis-
cretionary, at least one immigration court has terminated removal proceed-
ings based on violations of the guidelines. 3 5 1
348. But see supra Part II.C and accompanying discussion on the anti-retaliation pro-
visions of employment laws.
349. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988); Heidt,
supra note 16, at 1096-97 (acknowledging and ultimately rejecting the common belief
that prosecutors cannot obtain testimony produced under a civil protective order).
350. See Memorandum from Office of Field Operations & Office of Programs, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Mgmt. Team et al., Questioning Persons Dur-
ing Labor Disputes, Revised Operations Instruction 287.3a (Dec. 20, 1996), available at
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/emprights/RevisedOpnst.pdf; see also Ho &
Chang, supra note 65, at 522 n.216 (discussing internal guidelines).
351. In re Herrera-Priego, U.S. D.OJ. EOIR, at 23, 25 (July 10, 2003), available at
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/IWRMaterial/Advocate/Herrera-Priego.pdf. But
see Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing removal despite
employer retaliation); Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 385 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997) (same);
Nessel, supra note 119, at 385 (criticizing the lack of any enforcement mechanism in the
internal guidelines).
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4. Transfer Problems
In addition to flagging issues, it might appear that invocation creates a
transfer problem in which the immigrant leaves an evidentiary trail that the
government can use to initiate removal proceedings. Upon closer analysis,
however, the privilege in fact creates little or no transfer risk. Because
removal proceedings are deemed civil in nature,35 2 the respondent may
claim the privilege to the same extent as in immigrant-initiated civil litiga-
tion. Thus, the immigrant can claim the privilege in response to incrimi-
nating questions asked during removal proceedings. 3 53 Likewise, the
immigration judge can draw adverse inferences from a respondent's
silence.35 4
If an immigrant asserts the privilege as a plaintiff in an employment
case, the question becomes whether any inference flowing from the asser-
tion could be admitted as evidence in a subsequent removal proceeding.
There are several reasons why that scenario is highly unlikely. First, there
would be no point in transferring an adverse inference from the civil case
to the removal proceeding. The immigration judge can question the
respondent and draw adverse inferences from his silence without relying
on the record from the preceding litigation. Second, the inference from the
employment case would not inform the removal proceeding. The trial
judge in the civil case would have drawn the inference based on the unique
characteristics of the action such as the relevance of Hoffman to the employ-
ment claims at issue. Because the removal proceeding would involve com-
pletely different issues, any prior inference would not assist the
immigration judge in determining removability.
In contrast to invocation, both protective orders and outright admis-
sions create enormous transfer problems. As explained above, if the immi-
grant seeks damages for lost work and the court holds that Hoffman
eliminates certain remedies, the court may issue a protective order that
limits dissemination of status-based information. If the plaintiff admits
that she is an unauthorized immigrant under the protective order, her dis-
closure is potentially transferable to later criminal proceedings. Protective
orders have been misconstrued as "comparable to immunity" in preventing
the government from obtaining and using civil discovery in subsequent
criminal proceedings. 35 5. Judges who issue protective orders, however, can-
352. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
353. Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442, 1443 (9th Cir. 1984); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d
957, 959 (9th Cir. 1968).
354. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043; Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th
Cir. 1975); see Kanstroom, supra note 220, at 605-06 (discussing Fifth Amendment
invocations and adverse inferences in removal proceedings).
355. See Donnici, supra note 140, at 25-31; Osum R. LaTrobe, Note, Constitutional
Law: Self-Incrimination and Court Granted Immunity in Civil Litigation, 27 OKLA. L. REV.
243, 248 (1974) (equating protective orders with use immunity).
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not grant immunity, as such power is reserved to the executive branch. 35 6
In order to avoid the separation of powers problem presented by equating
protective orders with immunity, courts have almost uniformly allowed
prosecutors to obtain "protected" civil discovery. 3 5 7 Therefore, an immi-
grant who reveals information about her unauthorized status under the
supposed shelter of a protective order does so at her own peril.
35 8
Conclusion
Hoffman altered the landscape of civil discovery for immigrants and
those who appear to be immigrants. This new era of status-based discov-
ery will continue as long as Hoffman's substantive reach remains an open
question. As it stands now, plaintiffs assert all available claims, defendants
argue that the plaintiffs status matters, and an entire class of immigrant
workers withdraws from the process. The inhibitive reach of these ques-
tions extends beyond current immigrant litigants to prospective plaintiffs
who survey the tactical battlefield of civil discovery and decline to enter.
The privilege against self-incrimination is the most effective method
for breaking the stalemate. The libertarian rationales underlying the privi-
lege carry particular force in civil cases brought by immigrants. The privi-
lege prevents immigrant-initiated litigation from becoming a quasi-criminal
discovery process through which private employers gather incriminating
evidence that can lead to the immigrant's removal or prosecution. In addi-
tion, the privilege eliminates the cruel choice of deceit, penalized silence,
and self-incrimination that the immigrant would otherwise face. Absent
the privilege, immigrants would avoid making these choices by simply
ignoring workplace violations and staying out of court.
In addition to supporting the Fifth Amendment's underlying ratio-
nales and the immigrant's litigation interests, invocation encourages sub-
stantial progress during the litigation by bringing focus to the relevance, if
any, of the negative inference that may be drawn from the witness's silence.
Thus, the privilege advances the central legal issue following Hoffman:
whether unauthorized immigrants enjoy equal rights and remedies in the
workplace. The explanatory effect of invocation benefits both current
plaintiffs and other immigrants who understandably remain averse to
asserting workplace claims in this hazy legal reality.
356. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (2000); Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261
(1983); United States v. D'Apice, 664 F.2d 75, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Daley, 549
F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1977).
357. See Andover Data Serv. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("[A] court in a civil action is simply without the means to fashion a suffi-
ciently durable safeguard for the full protection of the Fifth Amendment rights .... ); see
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 62 F.3d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 995 F.2d 1013, 1020 (11th Cir. 1993). But see Martindell v. Int'l Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (requiring the government to demonstrate
a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances in order to obtain information sealed
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358. See Rabon, supra note 164, at 529-30; Youngelson, supra note 345, at 276 (stat-
ing that a protective order is not comparable to a grant of immunity).
Vol. 41
2008 Fear of Discovery 81
Hoffman was intended to limit remedies available to unauthorized
immigrants in labor disputes; it was not intended to deputize employers
with discovery weapons to brandish before plaintiff immigrants. Do you
have papers? Until workers develop an effective response, employers will
continue to pose such questions, workplace violations will go unremedied,
and unauthorized immigrants will remain shrouded in Hoffman's fog.

